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Retaliation in an EEO World
DEBORAH L. BRAKE*
This Article examines how the prevalence of internal policies and complaint
procedures for addressing discrimination in the workplace are affecting legal
protections from retaliation. Retaliation has been an unusually active field of law
lately. The Supreme Court’s heightened interest in taking retaliation cases in recent
years has highlighted the central importance of retaliation protections to the integrity
of discrimination law. The Court’s string of plaintiff victories in retaliation cases has
earned it the reputation as a pragmatic, pro-employee Court when it comes to
retaliation law. However, this view does not account for the proliferation and
influence of employer EEO policies and complaint procedures. Reviewing the sociolegal scholarship on the structure and functioning of the EEO workplace reveals
important insights into how retaliation law operates. This Article contends that,
considered against the backdrop of how employer policies channel employee
complaints, the picture of retaliation law for employees is not nearly as rosy as the
Court’s decisions have led legal scholars to believe. Focusing on the interplay
between retaliation doctrine and employers’ internal discrimination policies, the
Article demonstrates that the lesser level of protection afforded to internal
discrimination complaints creates stark dilemmas for employees who follow employer
policies to complain about perceived inequality in the workplace. Two doctrines in
particular, the reasonable belief doctrine and the notice requirement, clash with the
role of employer policies in shaping employee perceptions of and responses to
discrimination in the workplace. The Article concludes by offering a proposal for
revamping retaliation law to better accommodate the realities of the EEO workplace.
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INTRODUCTION
Most employees know something about employment discrimination law, or at
least believe that they do. Their knowledge comes not from statutory language,
court cases, or regulations, but from their own employers’ policies and procedures
for addressing discrimination. Employees today operate in an EEO world—the
familiar acronym for Equal Employment Opportunity—and have for quite some
time. Specialized compliance personnel, often working out of discrete EEO offices,
oversee these policies and exhort employees to follow them. And yet, the EEO
workplace is barely visible in the world that the Supreme Court has conjured when
it has addressed claims alleging retaliation for challenging discrimination.
Notwithstanding the Court’s seemingly pro-plaintiff stance in retaliation cases in
recent years,1 this Article contends that retaliation law has failed to come to terms
with the EEO workplace, leaving employees vulnerable if they raise discrimination
complaints through these processes.
It is not as if the Supreme Court has kept its peace on retaliation law while the
EEO workplace has taken hold. The Court has been unusually prolific on the
subject of retaliation in recent years. From 2005 to 2011, the Court decided seven
cases involving retaliation for challenging discrimination—an average of one per
year.2 In each of these, the Court reversed a narrow lower court ruling to decide the
issue in favor of the plaintiff. This track record has caused many observers to view
the Court as pro-plaintiff when it comes to retaliation.3
This reputation has developed especially because of the contrast with the
Court’s approach to the rest of its employment discrimination docket. During the
same time period, the Court has developed a reputation for being pro-employer
based on several decisions that take a restrictive view of employment
discrimination. In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,4 although clothed in

1. As this Article was nearing publication, the Supreme Court decided University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), a case that breaks the
string of plaintiff victories in retaliation cases in the Supreme Court. In a 5–4 decision, the
Court rejected the mixed-motive framework, requiring employees to prove but-for causation
in retaliation cases under Title VII. While this ruling creates additional hurdles for plaintiffs
in causation cases, it does not directly affect the interaction of the EEO workplace and the
retaliation doctrines discussed in this Article. For a critique of the decision, see Joanna L.
Grossman & Deborah L. Brake, Revenge: The Supreme Court Narrows Protection Against
Workplace Retaliation in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
VERDICT (July 9, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/2013/07/09/revenge-the-supreme-court
-narrows-protection-against-workplace-retaliation-in-university-of-texas-southwestern
-medical-center-v-nassar.
2. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville
& Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271 (2009); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442
(2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
3. It is too soon to say how the recently decided Nassar case will affect the Court’s
reputation in retaliation law, but the tenor of this case is certainly more in line with the rest
of the Court’s discrimination cases than the prior seven retaliation cases.
4. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
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the procedural garb of Title VII’s statute of limitations, the Court’s decision
betrayed a narrow, individualistic view of the intent required to prove pay
discrimination.5 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,6 while ruling on class action
certification, the Court took a skeptical view of systemic disparate treatment,
casting doubt on the long-standing theory that substantial and unexplained
underrepresentation of the plaintiff class in specific job categories raises an
inference of a pattern and practice of discrimination.7 In the realm of age
discrimination, the Court surprised even the litigants in the case, who had not
briefed the issue, by eviscerating the mixed-motive framework under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.8 More recently, the Court expanded the scope
of the judicially implied ministerial exception, expanding the numbers of jobs at
religiously affiliated workplaces exempted from coverage.9 And even though the
Court decided for the firefighter-plaintiffs in the “reverse discrimination” case of
Ricci v. DeStefano,10 the decision lowers incentives for employers to abide by
disparate impact law, possibly heralding the demise of the disparate impact claim
itself.11
Against this backdrop, the Court’s retaliation cases appear, on balance, proemployee. While the Court’s decisions reveal skepticism about the extent of
employment discrimination in the modern era, fueled by a narrow understanding of
what counts as discrimination, the Court has been more receptive to retaliation
claims by persons challenging discrimination. Among the commentators taking
note of the Court’s different tune, the prevailing view is that retaliation law, unlike
employment discrimination law, adequately protects employees.
This Article challenges that understanding, arguing that it does not account for
the most significant development in the field in the past two decades: the growth
and influence of internal channels for addressing discrimination complaints. The
Supreme Court’s retaliation decisions have been described as pragmatic and
purposive, settling on interpretations that cohere with the purpose of enabling the
full enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes. However, the Court has not
grappled with the single most troubling aspect of retaliation law in light of the

5. See Deborah L. Brake, What Counts as “Discrimination” in Ledbetter and the
Implications for Sex Equality Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 657, 657–58 (2008); Tristin K. Green,
Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (2008).
6. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
7. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395 (2011); Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455 (2011).
8. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); see also Melissa Hart, Procedural
Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-2009 Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 264–74 (2009) (critiquing Gross).
9. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706
(2012).
10. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
11. E.g., Allen R. Kamp, Ricci v. DeStefano and Disparate Treatment: How the Case
Makes Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause Unworkable, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2011);
Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?, 90
B.U. L. REV. 2181 (2010).
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proliferation of internal EEO processes: the law’s lower level of protection for
employees who pursue internal complaints compared to those who pursue external
enforcement through courts or government agencies. As a result, the lower courts
have developed a body of law that creates stark dilemmas for employees who use
employers’ internal channels for complaining about discrimination—that is,
employees who follow the employer’s rules and norms for trying to resolve
problems internally first. This body of law, as yet unchecked by the Supreme
Court, is anything but pragmatic, and undermines the Court’s promise of a wellfunctioning enforcement mechanism for securing compliance with employment
discrimination statutes.
Scholars working in the interdisciplinary field of sociology and law have long
known the importance of internal governance mechanisms for shaping employee
understandings of, and responses to, discrimination. Their studies of the EEO
workplace have explored the role played by personnel experts in determining the
content of employer nondiscrimination policies in ways that broaden narrower,
legalistic understandings.12 The resulting employer policies channel employee
complaints through the filters created by specialized EEO personnel. This
scholarship contains useful insights for exploring how retaliation law actually
functions in the EEO workplace.
Two doctrines in particular pose problems for employees who use their
employer’s EEO policies to complain internally.13 First, internal reports of
discrimination are protected from retaliation only if predicated on an objectively
reasonable belief that the employer engaged in unlawful discrimination.14 While an
objective reasonableness constraint sounds innocuous enough, courts use the
substantive law of discrimination as the outer limit on reasonableness.15 Employer
EEO policies, however, go far beyond legalistic definitions of discrimination to
reach a much broader range of practices. Encompassing sexual harassment, racial
harassment, diversity management, affirmative action efforts, and broad promises
of respect, fairness, and collegiality, employer policies far exceed the minimum of
what discrimination law requires. Employees who take these promises seriously
and raise concerns when they fall short can find themselves ensnared in the
reasonable belief doctrine, with no allowance for how their employer’s EEO policy
shaped their beliefs.

12. See infra text accompanying notes 91–120.
13. The problems with retaliation law addressed in this Article are compounded by a
distinct trend in the lower courts that leaves the employees who manage and investigate EEO
complaints without adequate protection from retaliation for their role in these processes. This
doctrine, and the dilemmas facing EEO compliance personnel, is the subject of a future
article. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in the EEO Office, (working draft) (on file with
author). The present Article focuses on the problems facing the employees who use
employer EEO processes.
14. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (finding internal
complaint about sexual harassment unprotected from retaliation because plaintiff lacked an
objectively reasonable belief that what she complained about was actually unlawful under
Title VII).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 130–83.
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Second, retaliation law requires employees who complain internally to be clear
and precise in phrasing their complaints in terms of discrimination. For example,
complaining about disrespectful treatment or incivility in the workplace may not be
specific enough, under this doctrine, to put an employer on notice that the
employee is complaining about discriminatory harassment.16 However, employer
EEO policies and the personnel who oversee them often steer employees in other
directions. EEO policies need not track legal nondiscrimination rights, and often
merge broader promises of fairness with nondiscrimination guarantees. Internal
complaint processes channel complaints away from rights-claiming language and
into the vernacular of managerial and professional concerns. Courts applying this
doctrine leave some complaints about inequality in the workplace unprotected for
lack of specificity without accounting for how EEO policies shape the framing of
employees’ complaints.17
Despite the proliferation of internal EEO systems for handling discrimination
complaints and renewed academic interest in retaliation law, legal scholarship has
not explored the interaction between the two. The Supreme Court’s retaliation
cases paint a mostly rosy impression of the state of retaliation law, one that does
not match up with the body of law developing in the lower courts. The Court’s
decisions do not speak to the binds facing employees who report discrimination
under employer nondiscrimination policies. By exposing these dilemmas, this
Article contributes both to the literature on retaliation law and to critiques of
employer EEO processes. Critiques have questioned the effectiveness of such
processes in ending discrimination but have not recognized that gaps in retaliation
law may make such policies not just ineffective but actually harmful. Evaluation of
the efficacy of internal EEO policies must consider not just prevention of
discrimination but the likelihood of retaliation and the adequacy of legal
protections against it.
Part I of this Article reviews recent developments in retaliation law in the
Supreme Court and in academic literature. The past seven years have witnessed a
surge in retaliation cases in the Court. This Part explains those decisions and the
issues left undecided. The uptick in retaliation cases has drawn attention from the
legal academy, and the second half of this Part surveys the new retaliation
scholarship. With few exceptions, commentators have reacted favorably to the
Court’s retaliation case law, depicting it as an exception to the Court’s proemployer perspective in employment discrimination law generally.
Part II describes the EEO world in which retaliation law operates. It sketches the
explosion of employer policies addressing discrimination and the legal
developments that incentivize them. Such policies have become so integral to
discrimination law that it is a mistake to see them as separate and independent from
it. Employers have much to gain by having antidiscrimination policies and much to
lose if they do not. The resulting internal governance structure has a greater day-today influence on employee understandings of discrimination than the external law
does. This structure shapes how employees think about, express, and complain
about discrimination. The proliferation of internal employer processes for handling

16. See infra text accompanying notes 253–54.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 307–12.
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discrimination complaints has important implications for the workings of retaliation
law, which are taken up in Part III.
Part III examines how retaliation doctrine intersects with employer EEO
processes to the detriment of employees. In particular, two developments—the
reasonable belief doctrine and the notice requirement—create troubling roadblocks
for employees using internal employer channels to raise concerns about perceived
discrimination. These doctrines undermine the promising notes sounded by the
Supreme Court’s headliner retaliation cases.
Part IV concludes by considering the implications of this clash, both for
retaliation law and for assessing the role of internal EEO governance. The
prominent role of EEO policies in channeling employee responses to discrimination
leaves retaliation law in dire need of an overhaul. As a starting point, courts should
reconsider the formalistic split between internal and external complaints in cases
where employees use the EEO policies their employers have established—an issue
that the Supreme Court has left undecided. By placing internal complaints made
pursuant to an employer’s established EEO procedures on the same level as
complaints filed with the government, retaliation law can resolve the dilemmas
now facing employees who follow EEO policies to complain internally. In addition,
in cases where courts continue to evaluate internal complaints under the opposition
clause, they should evaluate the reasonableness and specificity of employee
complaints in light of how they are shaped by employer EEO policies. Unless
retaliation law adjusts to keep pace with the EEO workplace, retaliation law will
fall far short of the Supreme Court’s expressed aims and will function to legitimate
discrimination law’s failings rather than to secure its enforcement.
I. THE RETALIATION REVIVAL
Retaliation law has been an active field lately. This Part summarizes
developments in Supreme Court case law and in legal scholarship. Despite the proplaintiff decisions in the Court’s cases, its precedents continue to leave internal
complaints of discrimination with significant gaps in legal protection. And despite
their out-sized role in channeling employee complaints, internal EEO systems have
not been the central focus of legal commentary on retaliation. As a result, the
overarching message of a pro-plaintiff body of law collides with the actual
experiences of many employees who forfeit meaningful protection from retaliation
when they press their concerns about discrimination through internal EEO
channels.
A. The Retaliation Docket in the Supreme Court
Since 2005, the Supreme Court has decided seven retaliation cases, a veritable
bonanza given the size of the Court’s docket.18 The cases can be grouped into two

18. That number has now reached eight, with the Nassar case, which was decided while
this Article was being finalized. See supra note 1. This case will likely dampen the Court’s
reputation for being pro-employee in retaliation cases. However, in following the theory of
causation first set down in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009), the Nassar
decision likely reflects the Court’s strict approach to causation in a discrimination statute,
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classes. The first group addresses the question of whether protection from
retaliation follows implicitly from a general ban on discrimination that does not
mention retaliation. A second set of cases required the Court to determine the scope
of a specific provision covering retaliation. In both groups of cases, the Court
dodged strict textual arguments to embrace broad readings of the statutes,
highlighting the need for adequate protection in order to ensure effective
enforcement of statutory bans on discrimination.
The cases in the first group—Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,19
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,20 and Gomez-Perez v. Potter21—involve the
nature of the relationship between retaliation and discrimination. In Jackson, a
former girls’ basketball coach lost his coaching position after he advocated his
team’s right to equal treatment under Title IX.22 The lower court had ruled that
Title IX, which prohibits discrimination because of sex, does not support a claim
for retaliation. In a 54 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed. Unlike Title VII,
Title IX contains an implied private right of action, so Congress’s failure to
mention retaliation in the statute was not dispositive, the Court reasoned.23 That left
the Court to consider the nature of the relationship between a general ban on
discrimination and a retaliation claim. With cryptic reasoning, the Court asserted
that retaliation for complaining about sex discrimination is a form of sex
discrimination itself.24 The Court’s logic is underwhelming, as it turns on the
illegality of the discriminatory practice underlying the complaint, even though
courts have never required proof of unlawful discrimination as a predicate to a
retaliation claim.25 Indeed, in Jackson itself, the Court did not examine the merits
of the coach’s discrimination complaint in upholding the retaliation claim. The
Court’s primary concern was not theoretical consistency, but rather ensuring that
the statute could be effectively enforced. This led the Court to extend protection
beyond the victims of sex discrimination to include complainants such as Coach
Jackson. While the connections between discrimination and retaliation are undertheorized, the Court’s opinion reflects the very real and important concern that
unchecked retaliation would eviscerate the effective enforcement of the statute.
The next two cases, decided three years after Jackson, were somewhat easier for
the Court to decide, but still involved textual hurdles. In CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries,26 the Court had to decide whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a Reconstructionera statute prohibiting race discrimination in the creation and enforcement of
contracts, supported a retaliation claim. Like Title IX, the statute did not mention
retaliation. Along with Jackson, the Court relied on an older precedent for support.
rather than a wholesale backpedaling in retaliation cases more specifically.
19. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
20. 553 U.S. 442 (2008).
21. 553 U.S. 474 (2008).
22. He retained his position as a teacher, but lost the supplemental pay and
responsibilities attached to the coaching position. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172.
23. Id. at 174–75.
24. Id. at 173–74, 178.
25. See id. at 185–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a critique of the Court’s reasoning,
supplemented with a theoretical justification for recognizing the retaliation claim, see
Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18 (2005).
26. 553 U.S. 442 (2008).
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Decades earlier, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,27 the Court construed a
similarly worded statute—42 U.S.C. § 1982, barring race discrimination in
contracts for property rights—to support a white lessor’s challenge to retaliatory
actions when he rented his house to a black man. At the time, the Court invoked the
doctrine of third-party standing, allowing the white lessor to bring a race
discrimination claim.28 The Humphries Court now explained the case as involving
retaliation, citing Jackson in support of this reading.29 This time, only Justices
Thomas and Scalia dissented, arguing that the text, which guarantees to “all
persons” the “same right” to contract as “white citizens,” encompasses only race
discrimination and not retaliation.30 The majority’s broader reading traced back to
the same concerns about effective enforcement underlying its earlier decision in
Sullivan.
A more recent enactment, the federal employment provision of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), presented the Court with a similar but
somewhat harder problem. Although the ADEA’s general provisions include a
section forbidding retaliation, the 1974 amendment adding coverage of federal
sector workers did not. This provision is worded more simply, forbidding
“discrimination based on age” without detailing specific practices or mentioning
retaliation.31 In Gomez-Perez v. Potter,32 decided the same term as Humphries, the
Court held that this provision implicitly encompasses protection from retaliation.
This time three Justices dissented, with Chief Justice Roberts joining the two
Humphries dissenters, arguing that the inclusion of a retaliation provision
elsewhere in the statute foreclosed finding retaliation implicitly covered.33 The
majority’s way around this textual roadblock was to circle back to Congress’
choice of a broad general ban on discrimination, and its determination in Jackson
that such a broad ban implicitly encompasses retaliation. The Court also noted that
the omission was unsurprising given the choice of general language in lieu of the
detailed listing of specific practices elsewhere in the statute.34
In all three cases, the Court took a purposive approach to the statutes,
recognizing protection from retaliation as necessary and implicit in a ban on
discrimination where not otherwise excluded. While essential for securing any
retaliation protections at all under these provisions, these cases did not address the
scope of protections provided or how they apply to internal complaints.
In the second set of cases, the statute’s coverage of retaliation was a given, but
the Court had to address disputes about the scope of protection provided. Again, the
Court decided each case in favor of the plaintiff. In the first, Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,35 the Court rejected the strict material adversity test
some lower courts had embraced under Title VII, in which retaliation is actionable

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

396 U.S. 229 (1969).
Id. at 237.
Humphries, 553 U.S. at 451.
Id. at 457–73 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
The federal sector provision is 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006).
553 U.S. 474 (2008).
Id. at 496–500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 486–88 (majority opinion).
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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only if it alters the terms and conditions of employment. Instead, the Court took a
more liberal approach, tying material adversity to the purpose of the retaliation
claim.36 The standard the Court adopted reaches retaliatory acts that “could well
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”37 The Court was careful to explain that the standard applies
objectively, but in light of the plaintiff’s circumstances.38 This time the Court was
on firm textual ground in refusing to tie the threshold for retaliation to the
differently worded antidiscrimination provision, but the ruling was also supported
by the purpose of enabling strong enforcement of the statute.39
Three years later, in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, Tennessee,40 the Court again rejected a stingy reading of Title
VII’s retaliation provision that would have undercut enforcement of the statute. In
that case, the plaintiff was a witness, at the behest of the employer, in an internal
investigation into sexual harassment charges brought by a colleague. The Sixth
Circuit had ruled that participation as a witness did not amount to the kind of
“active” or “overt” opposition to discrimination that the statute protected.41 The
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, focusing on the mischief that would
ensue if employers could freely retaliate against participating witnesses in an
internal investigation into a discrimination complaint. The Court cited the “ordinary
meaning” of the term “oppose,” but the policy implications of an alternative
interpretation also informed the Court’s understanding of the term.42 The Court
described as “freakish” a rule that would protect “an employee who reports
discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.”43
A tougher obstacle to a broad reading of Title VII’s retaliation provision
presented itself in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP.44 That case required
the Court to decide an issue that had long vexed the lower courts: whether
retaliation against someone other than the plaintiff, as a way of punishing the
plaintiff by association, is actionable under Title VII. By its terms, Title VII
protects only those individuals who engage in protected activity. Accordingly, the
lower court ruled that an employee who did not complain about discrimination
could not sue for retaliation when he was terminated, allegedly due to his fiancé’s
discrimination charge.45 The Court found a path around this unpalatable result by
using a different section of the statute setting out remedies for a “person
aggrieved,” and by defining that provision to include persons “within the zone of

36. Id. at 68.
37. Id. at 57.
38. Id. at 69–71.
39. Id. at 62–63.
40. 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
41. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 211 F. App’x 373, 376
(6th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
42. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276.
43. Id. at 278.
44. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
45. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
863 (2011).
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interests” of the statute.46 This necessarily includes an employee who suffers harm
because of his relationship to the complainant, the Court reasoned, permitting the
claim to proceed as a third-party claim for the violation of the complainant’s rights
to be free from retaliation. The “zone of interests” test invited the Court’s inquiry
into the purpose of the statute, which strongly supported its result.47 Otherwise, a
spiteful employer could punish complaints by targeting an employee in a close
relationship with the complainant.48
Finally and most recently, in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp.,49 the Court interpreted the retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). Although not a discrimination statute per se, dealing mostly with
wage and hour practices, the FLSA was amended in 1963 to include the Equal Pay
Act, which covers pay discrimination between women and men.50 Accordingly, the
case sits among the class of cases in this time span extending protection from
retaliation to challenging discrimination. Of all the cases, this one required the
starkest choice between a literal reading and a purposive approach to statutory
interpretation. The FLSA’s retaliation provision forbids an employer to
“discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under” the statute.51 The
language “filed any complaint” was the stumbling block, since the plaintiff had
only complained verbally to a supervisor, following the company’s internal
grievance policy. The lower court ruled that the language “filed any complaint” did
not encompass oral complaints.52 The Supreme Court disagreed, citing the circuit
split on the issue to “conclude that the language of the provision, considered in
isolation, may be open to competing interpretations.”53 But while the Court made
an attempt to counterbalance the dictionary definition of “filed” with more obscure
usages, its interpretation reflected attention to the policies behind the Act and how
they would be thwarted if oral complaints were not covered.54
Together, these seven cases give the impression of a Court strongly guided by
the policy objectives of retaliation law and cognizant of the real-world setting in
which retaliation takes place. The cases do not come entirely out of the blue. An
earlier case, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,55 read the term “employees” broadly enough
to include former employees who experience postemployment retaliation,
influenced largely by the policies underlying the statute. But the sheer number of

46. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
47. Id.
48. Justice Scalia, a strong proponent of textualism, authored the Court’s opinion. Id. at 866.
49. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
52. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838–40 (7th Cir.
2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
53. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1330–31.
54. Id. at 1333–34. The Court side-stepped the employer’s alternative argument,
deeming it waived, that the Act does not cover complaints directed to employers at all, only
those made to the government. The two dissenting Justices and the Seventh Circuit below
agreed with this position.
55. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
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the cases and their common theme, rejecting narrow textual readings, strike a
seemingly new—or at least louder—chord.
Despite their pro-employee bent, none of these cases closes the gap in retaliation
law addressed below: the inadequate protection for employees who complain
internally to their employer instead of externally to a government agency or court.
All but two of the Court’s decisions say nothing about protection of internal
complaints. And even the two that do, Crawford and Kasten, stop short of
addressing the doctrinal challenges employees face in bringing retaliation claims
based on internal complaints.56 While both cases are necessary and welcome
decisions for employees, since they reject alternative rulings that would have barred
some complainants from any protection whatsoever (witnesses in internal
investigations in Crawford and oral complainants challenging FLSA violations in
Kasten), they do not address the doctrinal hurdles discussed below that employees
must clear in bringing such claims.
While these seven cases together set up a laudable image of an anti-retaliation
Court, they are overshadowed in their actual impact by one outlier in this plaintifffriendly show, a case decided over a decade ago. In Clark County School District v.
Breeden,57 decided in 2001, the Court set lower courts on a path of markedly
different doctrinal protections for internal discrimination complaints versus
external complaints. The Breeden case is discussed in greater detail below, but its
primary significance is to deny retaliation protection for internal complaints if the
complainant lacked an objectively reasonable belief that the employer engaged in
unlawful discrimination.58 The decision has had a devastating impact for employees
complaining internally about discrimination, as discussed in Part IV below, but it
has done little to temper positive reactions to the Court’s seven recent decisions.
Now more than twelve years old, Breeden has faded into the background, where it
remains, shrouded in the sheep’s clothing of a per curiam opinion. While criticism
of Breeden has sharpened somewhat in recent years, it has not detracted from the
story line of a plaintiff-friendly Court in retaliation cases. Legal scholars have taken
notice of the Court’s new tune.
B. Retaliation in the Legal Scholarship
The Court’s burgeoning retaliation docket has been accompanied by a surge in
scholarly interest in retaliation. The size of this body of work pales in comparison
to the volume of literature on discrimination, but the uptick nevertheless marks a
renewed interest among academics in studying the claim. Most scholars writing in
the wake of the recent cases explore what they see as a contrast between the
Court’s pro-plaintiff retaliation cases and its more employer-friendly readings of
discrimination law, lauding the Court’s recognition of the realities of retaliation in
the workplace.

56. See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329–30; Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &
Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 273–74, 280 (2009).
57. 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
58. Id. at 271.
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Writing in this vein, Michael Zimmer describes the Court’s recent retaliation
decisions as pro-employee, from an otherwise pro-employer Court, and pragmatic,
in the sense of considering the consequences of competing interpretations and
weighing arguments about text, legislative intent, and precedent.59 Professor
Zimmer sees in the Justices’ opinions a model of statutory interpretation that aims
to determine the legislative purpose behind the statute and ensure that its
enforcement scheme works consistently with that purpose.60 He praises the Court’s
decisions for moving the law forward and creating potentially “robust” protection
from retaliation.61 Other scholars have likewise remarked upon the pragmatic bent
of the decisions, contrasting it with the Court’s more formalist and pro-employer
approach to employment discrimination cases.62
Richard Moberly joins in describing the Court’s retaliation cases as proemployee, but goes a step further to articulate a guiding theory beneath the Court’s
decisions: an anti-retaliation principle that is pro-law enforcement as its guiding
norm.63 Viewed through this lens, the Court treats retaliation law as a lawenforcement tool that benefits society and the legal system, and not just as a
balancing act between employee rights and employer prerogatives. Professor
Moberly distinguishes this core principle from one that is guided by the substantive
norms of antidiscrimination law. He takes as the lesson from the Court’s retaliation
precedents “that the Court rightly values retaliation protection” for its enhancement
of law enforcement.64 Richard Carlson joins in viewing the enhancement of law
enforcement as the guiding norm animating the Court’s retaliation precedents,
which he discusses in terms of protecting “citizen employees.”65 While Professor
Carlson sees greater ambivalence in the law’s overall protection of employees, he
holds up Title VII retaliation law as a robust example against which other areas of
employment law fail to measure up.66
Other scholars have addressed particular retaliation decisions, raising questions
about the scope of the rulings, while expressing general agreement with the overall
pro-employee tenor of the Court’s decisions. Matthew Green has explored the
question of what counts as “opposition” after Crawford,67 and discussed what kinds

59. Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation Decisions,
60 S.C. L. REV. 917 (2009).
60. Id. at 924.
61. Id. at 923.
62. See, e.g., Matthew W. Green, Jr., Family, Cubicle-Mate and Everyone in Between: A
Novel Approach to Protecting Employees from Third-Party Retaliation Under Title VII and
Kindred Statutes, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 249, 283–84, 299 (2012); Alex B. Long,
Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 525 (2011); Michael
Selmi, The 2007-2008 Term: The Government Changes Its Tune and the Supreme Court
Takes a Pragmatic Turn, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 161 (2008); Charles A. Shanor,
Employment Cases from the 2007-2008 Supreme Court Term, 24 LAB. LAW. 147 (2008).
63. Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 375 (2010).
64. Id. at 451.
65. Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237 (2009).
66. Id. at 243 (“There is no master anti-retaliation law of the order of Title VII to fill the
gaps . . . .”).
67. Matthew W. Green, Jr., Express Yourself: Striking a Balance Between Silence and
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of relationships are protected from third-party retaliation after the Court’s ruling in
Thompson.68 Jessica Fink has also addressed the question of third-party
relationships, taking a narrower view than Professor Green does of the relationships
protected under Thompson.69 Finally, Sandra Sperino has raised questions about
agency standards for determining liability for retaliation after Burlington Northern,
pointing to a potential disconnect if liability for retaliatory harassment proceeds on
a different course than sexual harassment.70 While articulating lingering uncertainty
and discussing ways to fill in the gaps, these scholars have not taken issue with the
general story line of a pro-plaintiff tilt in the Court’s recent retaliation
jurisprudence.71
The major exception to the pro-employee view of retaliation law from the
academy takes the form of critiques of the Court’s earlier decision in Clark County
School District v. Breeden,72 a case discussed in detail in Part III.A. Even here,
however, the case is treated as an anomaly in an otherwise pro-employee body of
law, rather than as a major impediment to the law’s overarching protection of
employees.73 Despite registering dissatisfaction with the decision, the critiques of
Breeden have not captured the magnitude of the problem with retaliation law and
its interaction with employers’ internal EEO processes.
In the sections that follow, this Article takes a broader lens in examining just
how badly retaliation law fits with the proliferation of internal employer processes
for addressing discrimination. In doing so, it provides a correction to the overly
optimistic view that the Supreme Court has created a plaintiff-friendly body of law

Active, Purposive Opposition Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 28 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 107, 150–51 (2010) (arguing for a standard requiring expressive activity, but
rejecting a stricter “active and purposive” standard).
68. Green, supra note 62, at 251–52 (arguing for a broad standard inclusive of coworker
relationships in applying Thompson’s protection from third-party retaliation).
69. See Jessica K. Fink, Protected by Association? The Supreme Court’s Incomplete
Approach to Defining the Scope of the Third-Party Retaliation Doctrine, 63 HASTINGS L.J.
521 (2012) (arguing for limits on protected relationships derived from the doctrine of
negligent infliction of emotional distress).
70. Sandra F. Sperino, The ‘Disappearing’ Dilemma: Why Agency Principles Should
Now Take Center Stage in Retaliation Cases, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 157 (2008) (arguing for
applying the Ellerth/Faragher liability standards to retaliation claims).
71. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-2009
Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253 (2009).
72. 532 U.S. 268 (2001); see Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New
Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469 (2007); Alex B.
Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of
Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 955 (2007); Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To
Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement
for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127
(2007).
73. See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 63, at 389 n.71 (stating that “Breeden likely does not
represent a serious deviation from the Antiretaliation Principle,” and citing commentators’
belief that Breeden “‘may simply be a case of unsympathetic plaintiffs making “bad law,”’
rather than a ‘signal [of] the Supreme Court’s hostility to retaliation cases in general.’”)
(quoting MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, CHARLES B. CRAVER, ELINOR P. SCHROEDER & ELAINE W.
SHOBEN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 160 (3d ed. 2005)).
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protecting employees from retaliation for challenging employment discrimination.
Although the seven recent Supreme Court decisions discussed above are indeed
pro-employee and pragmatic insofar as they go, focusing on the Court’s decisions
misses the forest for the trees. As applied in the lower courts, the law falls far short
of a pragmatist’s desire for retaliation protections that cohere with the purpose of
antidiscrimination statutes. Beneath the pro-plaintiff veneer is a hornet’s nest of
problems. These failings have left a much greater mark on the law in practice than
the Supreme Court’s exhortations about the importance of protecting employees
from retaliation. Before turning to the law’s doctrinal failings, it is important to
acknowledge just how pervasive and influential internal EEO processes have
become.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EEO WORKPLACE
Perhaps the most significant development in employment discrimination law in
the past two decades is the extent to which internal EEO policies and complaint
procedures have become normalized in the American workplace. They are overseen
and implemented by compliance personnel with responsibility over EEO matters,
including but not limited to the legal requirements of nondiscrimination. A range of
legal incentives strongly encourage employers to adopt and publicize these policies,
and encourage employees to use them.
A. Legal Incentives for Antidiscrimination Policies and Complaint Procedures
Of the many ways the law incentivizes employer nondiscrimination policies, the
most well-known apply to sexual harassment policies. In a pair of cases decided on
the same day in 1998, the Supreme Court incorporated the existence of employer
policies into the legal framework for determining employer liability for sexual
harassment. Both Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth74 and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton75 involved allegations of a supervisor’s sexual harassment of a
subordinate. Although the Supreme Court decided in 1986 that such harassment
violates Title VII, it did not at that time decide on a liability standard for such
cases, indicating only that agency principles would guide the development of the
law.76 In the intervening period, lower courts adopted a wide range of approaches,
including predicating liability on the supervisor’s use of the agency relation to
further the harassment, a standard tantamount to automatic liability.77 The Court
reined in this more expansive approach to liability in these twin cases, giving

74. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
75. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
76. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Court rejected the
employer’s argument that the bank’s sexual harassment policy should immunize it from
liability, noting the policy’s deficiency in requiring reporting to the target’s supervisor,
which in that case would have meant the harasser himself. In an aside, the Court suggested
the argument would have been “substantially stronger” if the policy had been better designed
to encourage victims to come forward. Id. at 73.
77. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994).
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employers an affirmative defense in cases where no tangible employment action
was taken.
The affirmative defense has two prongs: first, that the employer acted
reasonably to prevent and correct harassment; and second, that the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s channels to prevent or
correct harm.78 Employers can meet the first prong by having an adequate policy
and complaint procedure for reporting sexual harassment. The second prong is
designed to encourage employees to use the employer’s complaint process,
although, as much scholarship documents, many employees do not, often for good
reason.79 Since courts strictly apply prong two to employees who do not promptly
report harassment through employer channels, employers often escape liability by
having a policy and complaint procedure for addressing sexual harassment.80
Despite the origin of the affirmative defense as a limitation to vicarious liability for
supervisor harassment, lower courts are increasingly using employer policies to
mitigate liability in cases involving coworker sexual harassment too.81 With the
prominent role such policies now play in sexual harassment cases, it would be
foolhardy for an employer not to have such a policy.82
Sexual harassment law is the beginning, not the end, of the legal incentives for
employer policies and complaint procedures. For starters, the affirmative defense
applies to all forms of harassment covered by discrimination law, not just sexual
harassment. So employer policies on racial harassment and other forms of
actionable harassment are also incentivized through the same employer liability
standards as those adopted for sexual harassment. And regardless of the type of
harassment involved, employer liability for a constructive discharge, absent a

78. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765.
79. See, e.g., Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998);
Green, supra note 62, n.253. Courts can be tough on employees who do not report sexual
harassment through employer grievance policies. See, e.g., Barrett v. Applied Radiant
Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff’s failure to report alleged harasser
because he was close friends with the company president and vice-president was not
reasonable); Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff
did not act reasonably in delaying reporting supervisor’s sexual harassment).
80. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in
Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5–6 (2001).
81. E.g., Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
employer liability for coworker harassment depends on whether the employer took
“reasonable steps to discover and rectify acts of sexual harassment,” which turns on
“whether the employer designated a channel for complaints of harassment” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, 208 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2000)
(employer not liable under the knew or should have known standard where plaintiff failed to
report the harassment to the point-person identified in the employer’s sexual harassment
policy).
82. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271,
278 (2009) (rejecting employer’s argument that applying the opposition clause to protect
witnesses in employer investigations would discourage employers from investigating at all,
and explaining that the argument “underestimates the incentive” to have policies and do such
investigations under Ellerth and Faragher).
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tangible employment action, is also limited by the affirmative defense, again
making employer policies and complaint procedures highly relevant to an
employer’s liability risk.83
More broadly still, the role of employer policies in limiting liability risks is not
limited to harassment cases. Employer policies are highly relevant to punitive
damages for all types of discrimination. In Title VII cases, in order to recover
punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that the employer acted in bad faith or
with reckless disregard of employee rights.84 In a 1999 decision, the Supreme Court
explained that employers can avoid such a finding if they “adopt antidiscrimination policies and . . . educate their personnel on Title VII’s
prohibitions.”85 This standard encourages employers to have broad policies
covering all types of actionable discrimination, not just harassment.
In addition to judicially crafted liability rules, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also encourages employers to adopt
nondiscrimination policies and grievance procedures and to conduct regular
trainings to prevent discrimination.86 As if making good on this recommendation,
empirical research has found that the EEOC is significantly less likely to find
“cause” for discrimination in charges filed against employers who have EEO
policies in place than in charges filed against employers who do not.87 As this
finding suggests, the incentives for employers to adopt nondiscrimination policies
and complaint procedures go beyond the strictly doctrinal. Even when not directly
tied to a liability standard, internal policies provide employers with a certain
amount of insulation from legal claims. By establishing EEO offices, adopting
affirmative action plans, and having policies and complaint processes for
addressing discrimination, employers can demonstrate a visible commitment to
nondiscrimination when legal challenges are brought.88 Employers with such
policies achieve better outcomes in the legal system than those without them.89
One reason for this is that the most common type of discrimination complaint,
disparate treatment, requires challengers to prove intentional discrimination. Legal
actors take employer EEO policies and grievance procedures as an indication of the
absence of a discriminatory intention.90 As Lauren Edelman and her colleagues

83.
84.
85.
86.

Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 145 (2004).
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
Id. at 545.
E.g., EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, NO. 915.003, SECTION 15: RACE &
COLOR DISCRIMINATION 1104–21 (Apr. 19, 2006), available at eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race
-color.html; EEOC Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) No. 966, at 405:7651, 7661 (July 1999).
87. C. Elizabeth Hirsh & Sabino Kornrich, The Context of Discrimination: Workplace
Conditions, Institutional Environments, and Sex and Race Discrimination Charges, 113 AM.
J. SOCIOLOGY 1394, 1424–25 (2008).
88. C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Settling for Less? Organizational Determinants of
Discrimination-Charge Outcomes, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 239 (2008).
89. Id.
90. See Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger, Scott R. Eliason, Catherine R. Albiston
& Virginia Mellema, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized
Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 888, 906, 929–30 (2011).
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have shown, employer EEO processes have greatly influenced legal norms and
understandings about what it means to comply with antidiscrimination law—so
much so that judges have come to equate the presence of such policies with legal
compliance itself.91 As a result, “grievance procedures have emerged over the past
few decades as the primary symbol of nondiscrimination and as the most rational
way for employers to insulate themselves from legal liability.”92 This is true not
just for sexual harassment policies, but employer nondiscrimination policies in
general.93
Picking up on this theme, Frank Dobbin’s book, Inventing Equal Opportunity,
offers a historical view of the role personnel specialists, styled as equal opportunity
consultants or (later) diversity consultants, have played in shaping understandings
of, and compliance with, discrimination law.94 In his account, the combination of a
broad statutory framework and a weak regulatory state left a vacuum in which
employers responded to legal uncertainty by delegating authority to personnel
professionals to develop detailed internal regulatory programs.95 In the process,
employers did not merely respond to legal mandates, but played a key role in
defining the meaning of discrimination. Courts responded, in turn, with legal rules
that rewarded what proactive employers were already doing. Dobbin contends that
the proliferation of employer EEO strategies—including policies, grievance
procedures, and training programs—was not merely a response to the development
of discrimination law but a driving force in the law’s development.96
Whether a response to legal incentives or an agent in their development,
employer policies for handling discrimination complaints are now standard fare in
the American workplace. They simultaneously reflect legal incentives, shape the
meaning of the law’s requirements, and determine institutional compliance. As
Dobbin summarizes the extent of their influence, both “[j]ob hunters and judges are
suspicious of firms that don’t have them.”97

91. Lauren B. Edelman, Law at Work: The Endogenous Construction of Civil Rights, in
HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH 337 (Laura Beth Nielson & Robert
L. Nelson eds., 2005); Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The
Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC.
406, 407 (1999) (discussing the great weight given to the existence of antidiscrimination
grievance procedures in assessing compliance with antidiscrimination law).
92. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 91, at 407.
93. Lauren B. Edelman, Rivers of Law and Contested Terrain: A Law and Society
Approach to Economic Rationality, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 181, 190 (2004).
94. FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2009).
95. One of Dobbin’s insights in telling this history is that lawyers, who were more
cautious about predicting how the law would develop, lost their authority to personnel
professionals, who were bolder in asserting risk-management schemes, despite the lack of a
clear legal basis for doing so. Id. at 1–21.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2.
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B. The Realities of EEO Governance
The EEO office is a fixture of the modern workplace. This is especially true for
medium- and large-sized firms, but even companies too small to support an
independent EEO office make sure that these responsibilities are handled by some
staff person, along with other human resources matters.98 At the heart of these
responsibilities is the obligation to manage employer policies for addressing
discrimination.99
Sexual harassment policies and complaint procedures, supplemented with sexual
harassment training programs for employees, are by now an established part of the
legal landscape.100 As early as 1993, a survey of human resources directors found
that 95% of large employers, those with 500 or more employees, had policies
specifically designed for handling sexual harassment complaints.101 And that was
five years before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher.
According to Dobbin, by 1998, when the two cases were decided, 95% of all
employers (large and small) already had grievance procedures in place that could
be used for reporting sexual harassment.102
Sexual harassment policies tend to get the most attention, but employer policies
do not stop there. Policies on harassment cover not just sexual harassment but also
racial harassment and harassment based on other status characteristics.103 Nor are
employer policies limited to harassment. Beyond harassment, employer policies
cover the gamut of potentially discriminatory practices of all kinds.104 In addition to
setting up policies and complaint procedures, many employers have training
programs designed to prevent discrimination and manage intergroup relations,
often styled “diversity training[s].”105
Reliable data is hard to come by, but it is the rare employer today that lacks an
internal policy and complaint procedure for addressing allegations of

98. Id. at 86–88, 95–97, 130–31.
99. See id. at 93–94; see also Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson
Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 278–79 (2009) (noting petitioner’s brief’s citation of “studies
demonstrating that Ellerth and Faragher have prompted many employers to adopt or
strengthen procedures for investigating, preventing, and correcting discriminatory conduct”).
100. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable
Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 147–55 (2001) (explaining the history of employers’ embrace of
sexual harassment policies, complaint procedures, and training programs).
101. Bonnie G. Mani, The Employer’s Advantage in Sexual Harassment Cases: How the
Courts Have Discouraged the Victims of Sexual Harassment, 24 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL
ADMIN. 41, 45 (2004).
102. DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 4, 191; see also id. at 213 (noting that by 1997, 75% of
employers in national sample had sexual harassment training and 96% had a sexual
harassment grievance procedure).
103. Id. at 201 (explaining that human resources experts recommended broad harassment
policies, not limited to sexual harassment but including other forms of harassment as well).
104. Id. at 93–94.
105. Marc Bendick, Jr., Mary Lou Egan & Suzanne M. Lofhjelm, Workforce Diversity
Training: From Anti-Discrimination Compliance to Organizational Development, 24 HUM.
RESOURCE PLAN., no. 2, 2001, at 10, 11.
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discrimination in the workplace.106 As these policies have proliferated, they have
become increasingly dominant in shaping employee responses to discrimination.
Employer policies and EEO staff encourage employees to raise their concerns
through these internal channels instead of taking them outside the organization.107
Few employees take the drastic step of formal legal action, such as filing a charge
with the EEOC, to challenge discrimination and certainly not as a first resort.108
Most workers, if they complain at all about perceived discrimination, first attempt
to informally negotiate their rights.109 Even if employees ultimately do seek legal
recourse, they typically first try to address problems through their employers’
internal complaint processes.110
Beyond shaping the process by which employees complain about
discrimination, employer policies have had a marked effect on the culture of the
workplace, including on how employees perceive equal opportunity and what it
means to discriminate. As Frank Dobbin has pointed out, the law’s open-ended ban
on discrimination left room for personnel offices and EEO consultants to read their
own content into the law.111 Their interpretations often exceed the strict legal
requirements of antidiscrimination law. For example, one comprehensive text
written for human resources professionals describes civil rights laws as a general
mandate for workplace fairness and diversity.112 Referring to Title VII, the Equal
Pay Act, and other federal nondiscrimination laws, the manual declares, “In
combination these laws serve as levers to pry open the doors of economic
opportunity for others to enter and to maintain reasonable working conditions once
they are inside.”113 Altogether, it concludes, federal nondiscrimination laws “can be

106. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 334–36 (2005).
107. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 91, at 427–29.
108. Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model
of Employment Discrimination Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
RESEARCH, supra note 91, at 3, 30 (concluding from the available data that less than one
percent of African American employees who believe they have experienced workplace
discrimination file a charge with the EEOC); cf. Hirsh & Kornrich, supra note 87, at 1424–
25 (noting that employees in EEO workplaces who experience discrimination are less likely
to file formal legal charges with external enforcement agencies, such as the EEOC; of those
who do, few are resolved with favorable outcomes).
109. See Catherine R. Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions:
Competing Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 14–15 (2005).
110. Moberly, supra note 63, at 435 (“Social science studies, for example, suggest that
most reports of wrongdoing begin as internal reports.”); see also Sonia Goltz, Women’s
Appeals for Equity at American Universities, 58 HUM. REL. 763, 771–73 (2005) (finding that
in a study of fourteen women’s experiences suing their universities for discrimination, all
fourteen turned to internal informal processes first).
111. See DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 4–5; id. at 6 (describing how discrimination has come
to be understood as the absence of measures recommended by employer EEO personnel).
112. Mary E. Guy & Meredith A. Newman, Valuing Diversity in the Changing
Workplace, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT 149
(Stephen E. Condrey ed., 3d ed. 2010).
113. Id. at 165.
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viewed as a collective wind sock, indicating the necessity to open the workplace to
a more heterogeneous workforce.”114 In the sections that follow, this Article details
several specific areas where EEO understandings diverge from judicial
interpretations of the meaning of discrimination, with poor results for employees
under retaliation law.
The gap is particularly problematic because the interpretations of EEO
personnel have greatly shaped employee understandings of what it means to
discriminate. Internal policies and training programs now likely play a bigger role
in setting norms and behavior in the everyday workplace than the external law. As
Dobbin puts it, by “operationalizing” antidiscrimination law, human resources staff
and other EEO compliance personnel have greatly influenced how people
understand workplace discrimination.115
Although the jury is still out on the effectiveness of these processes in
preventing discrimination, the academic literature is skeptical at best.116 A common
complaint is that these processes protect employers, giving the appearance of
legitimacy, without helping the employees who use them.117 Employees report that
employers frequently respond with retaliation and inaction.118 The literature on
employee “voice” in organizations suggests that the mishandling of complaints is
now the primary way that organizations manifest tolerance of discrimination, using
terms for such reactions as “deaf ear syndrome” and “nullification.”119 On measures
of job satisfaction, psychological well-being, and health, employees who pursue
discrimination complaints with their employers generally fare worse than those
who do not.120
While the academic literature is largely critical of the effect of EEO policies in
actually preventing and remedying discrimination, it has not examined the poor fit
between these processes and the law’s protection against retaliation for the

114. Id. at 165–66.
115. DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 4–6.
116. E.g., id. at 21 (noting absence of research on the effectiveness of employer EEO
policies and practices, but noting that “[w]hat we do know is discouraging”); id. at 219
(discussing skepticism in the literature about the effectiveness of sexual harassment
policies); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 100, at 163–64 (arguing that training programs may
create a false sense of security without reducing the incidence of sexual harassment); Joanna
L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in
Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3–5 (2003) (questioning the
effectiveness of internal complaint procedures and sexual harassment policies). But see
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460–64 (2001) (discussing potential benefits of internalization of
antidiscrimination regulation).
117. E.g., Goltz, supra note 110, at 786 (discussing a common impression by the women
in the study that the internal complaint procedures were “designed primarily to discourage
people from suing” and to create the appearance of fairness).
118. Id. at 776 (reporting the most common responses to informal complaints as
retaliation, intimidation, inaction, and denying responsibility).
119. Id. at 764, 791; Karen P. Harlos, When Organizational Voice Systems Fail: More on
the Deaf-Ear Syndrome and Frustration Effects, 37 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 324 (2001).
120. Goltz, supra note 110, at 765.
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employees who use them. The next section addresses the mismatch between
retaliation doctrine and the EEO workplace.
III. RETALIATION LAW IN THE EEO WORKPLACE
The starting point for understanding how retaliation law intersects with
employer policies addressing discrimination is the law’s distinction between
internal and external complaints. Title VII’s retaliation provision has two distinct
clauses, the participation clause and the opposition clause. Complaints filed with a
government enforcement agency or a court fall under the participation clause.121
Complaints made to the employer, either informally or through a formalized
internal complaint process, fall under the opposition clause.122 To date, absent the
prior filing of an external complaint with the EEOC or other relevant government
agency, the lower courts have consistently placed internal complaints solely under
the opposition clause and outside of the participation clause, while the Supreme
Court has stayed silent on this issue.123 The differentiation of internal and external
complaints has its roots in the two separate clauses in Title VII, but it has worked
its way into retaliation law under other statutes too, despite the absence of
comparable statutory language.124 Given the significance of internal EEO complaint
processes in shaping discrimination claims, the dichotomy between the
participation and opposition clauses is now the central defining feature of
retaliation law.
Protection from retaliation is at its zenith for claims brought under the
participation clause. An employee who files a complaint with the EEOC, a state fair
employment agency, or a court has robust protection under this clause.125 The
opposition clause offers much more limited protection. Two doctrines in particular

121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (protecting an employee from retaliation if he or she
“has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”).
122. Id. (making it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
by [Title VII]”).
123. Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2012) (so holding and
collecting cases); see also Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty.,
Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 280 (2009) (not deciding whether the plaintiff’s participation in an
internal employer investigation might also fall under the participation clause, since the claim
could proceed under the opposition clause).
124. Jackson v. GEO Grp., Inc., 312 F. App’x 229, 234 (11th Cir. 2009) (importing Title
VII’s reasonable belief requirement to retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Jordan v.
Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 343–44 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); Mitchell v. Barnard Constr.
Co., 107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 661, 664 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (same); Bryant v. Gardner,
587 F. Supp. 2d 951, 964 nn.5–6 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (same with respect to Title IX).
125. See, e.g., Breeden v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 726,
727 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the opposition clause requires a reasonable belief in
discrimination, but the participation clause does not), rev’d per curiam on other grounds,
532 U.S. 268 (2001); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312
(6th Cir. 1989) (discussing broad scope of the participation clause); Pettway v. Am. Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 1969) (same).
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restrict the scope of the opposition clause in ways likely to clash with EEO policies.
First, employees lodging internal complaints must have an objectively reasonable
belief that the conduct complained about was actually unlawful.126 Second, they
must make clear that the subject of the complaint is discrimination and not some
more general concern.127 The rest of this Part explores these two problems, which
have the potential to derail the pragmatic path set by the Supreme Court’s
decisions.
A. “Tell Someone”/“How Could You Have Thought That?”: The Reasonable Belief
Trap and Employer EEO Policies
When legal scholars have criticized retaliation law, they have mostly taken issue
with the reasonable belief doctrine. Several scholars have criticized lower court
decisions for taking too narrow a view of reasonableness in gauging whether
opposition to perceived discrimination qualifies as protected conduct.128 In prior
articles, I have argued that courts mistakenly judge reasonableness by imposing
their own understanding of the law without taking into account the inherent
ambiguity in the meaning of “discrimination,” even as manifested in judicial
opinions.129 The more recent reasonable belief cases have only strengthened this
view. My focus in this Article, however, is the troubling lack of attention courts
pay to how employer EEO policies shape employee perceptions of, and responses
to, discrimination. The gap between the broad scope of employer nondiscrimination
policies and the much narrower category of actionable discrimination has not been
sufficiently explored in the legal scholarship. This Part examines recent court
decisions rejecting retaliation claims for lack of a reasonable belief in
discrimination. As these cases illustrate, courts often fail to consider how
employers’ own policies and procedures shape employee understandings of
discrimination, to the detriment of employees claiming retaliation.
With few exceptions, courts use the established legal meaning of discrimination,
backed up by citations to case law, as the outer limit of reasonableness. An
employee’s broader understanding is deemed unreasonable, even if it dovetails with
the approach taken in the employer’s own EEO policies.
The trouble began with a seemingly innocuous Supreme Court decision, one
apparently so noncontroversial that it came in the guise of a per curiam opinion. In
Clark County School District v. Breeden,130 the plaintiff repeatedly complained
about one incident of mildly explicit sexual banter. The plaintiff, her male
supervisor, and a male colleague had been in a meeting together reviewing job
applicants’ psychological evaluations. During the meeting, the plaintiff’s
supervisor read aloud a report from one of the files that the applicant had once said
to a female coworker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand

126. See infra text accompanying notes 134–35.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 253–54.
128. See sources cited supra note 72.
129. Brake, supra note 25, at 82–83; Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The
Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 919 (2008).
130. 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
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Canyon.”131 After reading the comment aloud, the supervisor looked at the plaintiff
and said, “I don’t know what that means.”132 The coworker replied, “Well, I’ll tell
you later,” and both men chuckled.133 No further information is given about the
incident, but apparently the plaintiff interpreted it as an offensive reference to
female anatomy and objected to her male colleague’s reading of the comment aloud
and the two men’s ensuing laughter. The plaintiff complained doggedly about the
incident, first internally, and later by filing a formal sexual harassment charge with
the state fair employment agency. In response to the internal complaint, the
plaintiff alleged that the company changed her job duties. The Court evaluated this
claim under the opposition clause and ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove that she
engaged in protected activity because she lacked an objectively reasonable belief
that the incident in question amounted to unlawful discrimination.134 Judging the
one incident against the severe or pervasive standard, the Court found it “at worst
an ‘isolated inciden[t]’” and concluded that no reasonable person could have
believed that it created a hostile environment.135
The case exemplifies the adage about bad facts making bad law. Clearly the
Court was correct that the incident, standing alone, did not create an actionable
hostile environment. The Court’s reasoning, however, laid the groundwork for
future problems by focusing on the absence of enough incidents to meet the
severity or pervasiveness threshold at the time that the plaintiff complained. The
Court might have avoided future problems by deciding the case on narrower
grounds, either ruling that the incident, ambiguous as it was, was not the type of
conduct, even cumulatively, that could create a hostile environment, or rejecting the
claim for lack of proof of causation. Instead, the case stands as a potent precedent
for ruling against retaliation plaintiffs whose understanding of discrimination is
broader than the courts’ narrower view.
Notably, the Court did not inquire into the existence of an employer policy on
sexual harassment. However, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion noted the school district’s
broadly worded policy on sexual harassment and counted it in support of the
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief.136 Explaining that the plaintiff consulted the
policy before complaining, the court observed that the policy defined sexual
harassment to include “uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, and questions,”
concluding “it is possible that a reasonable person in Breeden’s position could have
mistakenly believed that [her supervisor’s] behavior constituted unlawful sexual

131. Id. at 269. The disclosure was in response to a question about whether the applicant
had ever told sexually explicit jokes in the workplace.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 270–71. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the reasonable belief
standard governs, leaving open the possibility that the complained-of conduct must actually
be unlawful. Id. at 270. The lower court decisions after Breeden have likewise assumed that
the reasonable belief standard governs claims under the opposition clause.
135. Id. at 271 (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (alteration in
original)).
136. Breeden v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 726, 728 (9th
Cir. 2000), rev’d per curiam on other grounds, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
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harassment.”137 The Supreme Court’s failure to consider the employer’s sexual
harassment policy and its bearing on the employee’s belief has had ripple effects in
the years since Breeden was decided. The discussion below shows how courts
respond, in cases involving a wide range of discriminatory allegations, when
plaintiffs’ beliefs about discrimination clash with those of the court, regardless of
how well they mesh with the employer’s nondiscrimination policy.
1. Harassment Complaints
Not surprisingly, since Breeden itself involved a sexual harassment complaint,
the reasonable belief requirement has spawned a now-sizeable body of cases in
which internal complaints about harassment are unprotected because the underlying
conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable. As in Breeden,
employer policies on harassment do not enter into the courts’ analysis. Most of the
time, courts do not even mention the existence of employer policies; when they do,
it is by way of an aside instead of integrating them into the analysis of
reasonableness.138
One of the more troubling examples of the Breeden standard in action is the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.139 In that case,
the plaintiff, an African American male employee, complained after hearing a
coworker’s racial slur. The incident occurred in the office break room, where a
number of employees were gathered around a television set watching news of the
capture of a notorious pair of snipers, both of whom were black, who had been
terrorizing the D.C. metropolitan area. In the presence of the plaintiff, the coworker
exclaimed, “They should put those two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of
black apes and let the apes f—k them.”140 This remark bothered the plaintiff, and he
discussed it with two other coworkers, who told him that this same coworker often
made such comments. Following the employer’s harassment policy, the plaintiff
reported the incident to management.141 He was subsequently terminated, allegedly
in retaliation for his complaint.
Applying Breeden, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
for failure to state a claim on the ground that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable belief
that the coworker’s single outburst created a racially hostile environment. The court
agreed that the coworker’s comment “was unacceptably crude and racist,” but
called it “an isolated response” to the news coverage and a “far cry” from the
severe or pervasive conduct that violates Title VII.142 While the court

137. Id.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 153–63.
139. 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006).
140. Id. at 336.
141. Jordan worked as a network technician for Alternative Resources Corp. (ARC),
which assigned him to do work at IBM’s office. He sued both entities, jointly, as his
employers. The incident happened at IBM’s offices while Jordan was on assignment at IBM,
and he reported the incident pursuant to IBM’s policy on harassment. Id.
142. Id. at 339–40.
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acknowledged that repeated conduct of this ilk could potentially create a hostile
environment, there was no proof that “a plan was in motion” to do so.143
As an application of Breeden, the Jordan decision is troubling enough,
illustrating the perils of applying this standard to a complaint about conduct that,
when combined with more like it, might well create an actionable environment.
More troubling still is the failure of the court to consider how the employer’s
harassment policy shaped the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s response. Jordan’s
employer had a fairly standard policy on harassment, obliging employees to report
racially discriminatory harassment to management.144 The existence of the policy,
however, had no bearing on the court’s analysis of the reasonableness of the
plaintiff’s belief, which was measured solely by the substantive law of racial
harassment.145
Like Jordan, some of the worst offenders among the reasonable belief cases
involve complaints about harassment, both racial and sexual. Many of these cases
involve much more objectionable behavior than the single, allegedly off-color
remark and laughter that occurred in Breeden. The result is a catch-22 in which
plaintiffs must promptly report harassment to preserve their right to sue under
Ellerth/Faragher, but are unprotected from retaliation if they complain internally
too soon, before the perceived harassment could be reasonably understood as
severe or pervasive. Most of the legal scholarship critiquing the reasonable belief
doctrine focuses on the narrow space left for employees to preserve their right to
sue for sexual harassment without forfeiting protection from retaliation for
complaining too soon.146 While these critiques are important, there has not been
enough attention to the role employer policies play in shaping employee
perceptions of, and responses to, harassment.
Courts applying the reasonable belief doctrine to harassment complaints give
scant attention to how employer policies define harassment and direct employees to
handle it. The courts’ failure to do so is not surprising, since in Breeden itself the
Supreme Court did not examine the employer’s policy. Taking this cue, lower
courts have neglected to consider how employer harassment policies influence
employees’ perceptions and responses. The following discussion highlights some
of the more recent cases in this vein. The cases involve reports of racial as well as
sexual harassment, and the strictness of the reasonable belief doctrine does not vary
by the type of harassment alleged.

143. Id. at 340.
144. Id. at 350 (King, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, neither the majority nor the dissent
included the actual language of the policy in their opinions—itself an indication of judges’
refusal to permit employer policies to influence their views of the reasonableness of
employees’ beliefs.
145. See Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 467 F.3d 378, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2006) (denying
petition for rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1362 (2007). Judge King’s dissent
reiterates the troubling implications of the ruling for the Faragher/Ellerth liability
framework, in which employees lose the right to sue for harassment if they do not promptly
report harassment pursuant to employer policies. Id. at 381 (King, J., dissenting).
146. See, e.g., B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 493–94 (2008) (arguing
for a more generous interpretation of reasonableness in reporting sexual harassment in order
to better cohere with the affirmative defense).
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A typical case applying the reasonable belief doctrine to a racial harassment
report is Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation,147 which is frequently
cited and relied on by district courts. In this case, the plaintiff, an African American
woman, complained about two racial slurs a white coworker made while they were
driving back from lunch together. She alleged that she was fired for complaining
about the coworker’s use of a racist epithet. The jury found for the plaintiff on the
retaliation claim, but the appellate court reversed. As the court saw it, the plaintiff’s
belief that two uses of an “ugly, racist” epithet created a hostile environment was
“not even close” to being objectively reasonable.148 Citing circuit precedent, the
court found the conduct fell far short of the legal standard.149 Significantly, the
court evaluated the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief without any reference to
the existence or content of any employer policies covering racial harassment. As a
state employer, there likely would have been a detailed nondiscrimination policy
covering harassment, including racial harassment, and encouraging employees to
report it. It would be curious and unusual if such a policy exempted lunch breaks or
told employees not to bother if the harassment only amounted to two “ugly, racist”
epithets.
The cases take a similar approach to employee complaints of sexual harassment.
Another Eleventh Circuit case, Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc.,150 is illustrative.
There, the court ruled that the plaintiff, a waitress, could not have had a reasonable
belief that the manager’s demeaning comments about her breasts, combined with
other sexually tinged comments, amounted to a hostile environment.151
Remarkably, the court upheld summary judgment for the employer despite the
EEOC’s issuance of a for-cause determination on the plaintiff’s underlying sexual
harassment charge. The court not only ruled against her on the harassment claim,
but rejected her retaliation claim because it was unreasonable to believe that the
harassment was unlawful.152 The court made no mention of a company policy
covering sexual harassment in the workplace.
There are myriad cases like these that use the reasonable belief test to exclude
allegations that fall short of actionable harassment but go well beyond what
occurred in Breeden. In many cases, an employer policy on harassment is
mentioned in the background but not considered in the court’s analysis. In one of
these, Van Portfliet v. H&R Block Mortgage Corp.,153 the plaintiff, a male sales
manager, reported two accounts of harassment relayed to him by a female loan
manager whom he supervised. Both accounts involved their superior, a district
manager. The first occurred at a company-sponsored happy hour, in which the
district manager put his arm around the female loan officer and made an
inappropriate remark.154 The second happened that same evening, when the same

147. 536 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 2008).
148. Id. at 1213.
149. Id. at 1214.
150. 238 F. App’x 499 (11th Cir. 2007).
151. Id. at 503.
152. Id. at 501–03.
153. 101 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2007), aff’d per curiam, 290 F.
App’x 301 (11th Cir. 2008).
154. Specifically, the subject of the complaint was that the district manager, who was the
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district manager made a racial slur in the presence of an African American loan
officer.155 After learning of these incidents, the plaintiff reported them to the human
resources department. An investigation ensued, resulting in the district manager’s
termination. The plaintiff claimed that the new manager retaliated against him for
his role in these events. The jury agreed, but the verdict was overturned for lack of
a reasonable belief that the district manager had engaged in actionable harassment.
As the court put it, “The notion that this conduct comes close to constituting
unlawful sexual harassment is patently unreasonable.”156
In this case, the court acknowledged that the plaintiff had followed the
company’s harassment policy in reporting the two incidents to the company’s
human resources department.157 That was the extent of the court’s attention to the
policy, however. It had no bearing on the court’s analysis, which began from the
premise that the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief is measured by existing
law.158 Nor did the plaintiff receive any leniency for acting on behalf of people he
supervised.159 The court applied the reasonable belief doctrine with the same
stringency as if he himself had experienced the offensive behaviors.
Other courts likewise ignore harassment policies in judging the reasonableness
of employee beliefs about harassment. In Hill v. Guyoungtech USA, Inc.,160 the
court ruled that the plaintiff’s complaint about her male manager slapping her on
the buttocks lacked an objectively reasonable belief since it was a single incident.
The court sounded almost gleeful in citing a plethora of precedents with detailed
parentheticals describing more explicit and offensive sexual conduct where courts
nonetheless granted summary judgment to employers for lack of sufficient severity
or pervasiveness.161 Lest one misinterpret these citations for judicial approval of the
behavior, the court added a disclaimer that the manager’s “act of slapping
[plaintiff] on the buttocks in an effort to make her comply with his demand [to pick
up equipment that had spilled onto the floor] is certainly not condoned by this

plaintiff’s supervisor, had put his arm around the female loan officer, pulled her into him,
and said, “Why would you want to be with him [a male friend] when you can be with me?”
290 F. App’x at 302–03.
155. Van Portfliet, 101 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1295–96.
156. Id. at 1299.
157. Id. at 1296, 1300–01.
158. Id. at 1298; see also George, supra note 146, at 487–89, 492 (discussing and
critiquing Van Portfliet for not considering reasonableness from the perspective of the
employer’s sexual harassment policy, but limiting her critique of the reasonable belief
doctrine to sexual harassment complaints).
159. In this case, the loan officer reportedly did not ask the plaintiff to report it. Van
Portfliet, 101 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1296. Nonetheless, an employer policy may
not permit such allegations to be kept confidential and may instead place a duty on
supervisors to report potential or suspected harassment. See, e.g., Ellen McLaughlin & Carol
Merchasin, Training Becomes an Important Step to Avoid Liability, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29,
2001, at B10, available at http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/AttorneyPubs
/McLaughlin.pdf (suggesting that managers and supervisors have a “heightened duty to
report potential harassment or discrimination even if no complaint is made”).
160. No. 07-0750-KD-M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69388 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 2008).
161. See id. at *22–27 (citing cases with sexually explicit facts to support conclusion that
the behavior, while reprehensible, was not actionable).
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court, however, it was not an act which reasonably could be perceived as sexual
harassment under Eleventh Circuit law.”162
This court too observed that the company had a sexual harassment policy. In a
cryptic description of the policy, the court noted that it instructed employees who
believed they had experienced sexual harassment to report it to human resources,
which the plaintiff did.163 The court said nothing further about the substance of the
policy or how the plaintiff understood it to apply to her. The policy had no effect on
the court’s assessment of the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief that she had
been harassed.
It is a common refrain in the reasonable belief cases involving harassment
complaints that isolated or sporadic offensive comments do not meet the severity or
pervasiveness test for a hostile environment, so objecting to them is not protected
activity.164 In none of these cases do the courts consider how the plaintiffs’ beliefs
are influenced by employer policies on harassment.
Although these kinds of decisions have accelerated in the aftermath of Breeden,
there was some movement in this direction even before. In one of the earliest, Little
v. United Technologies,165 the Eleventh Circuit ruled as a matter of first impression
that an employee’s complaint about a coworker’s single racially offensive remark
was not “protected activity” under the opposition clause.166 The court reasoned that
the incident was not an unlawful employment practice because an employer is
liable for coworker harassment only if it knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.167 The decision leaves
employees in a catch-22: in order to put the employer on notice of coworker
harassment, an employee must report it. If the employer can retaliate against the
reporting employee with impunity, on the theory that the harassment is not yet
attributable to the employer, the chilling effect of potential retaliation could insulate

162. Id. at *30.
163. Id. at *11.
164. E.g., Session v. Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Bd., 462 F. App’x 323, 326 (4th Cir. 2012)
(finding it was not reasonable to believe that two perceived insults about being light-skinned
could have created a hostile environment); Wilson v. Farley, 203 F. App’x 239, 247–48
(11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting retaliation claim because white coworker’s single remark that he
was tired of the plaintiff’s “black ass” did not support an objectively reasonable belief in a
hostile work environment); Robinson v. Nielsen Co., No. 3:10-CV-9, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
138077, at *17 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2011) (holding that a single reference to the plaintiff, an
African American woman, as “chocolate,” combined with a comment supporting Don
Imus’s racial insult to the Rutgers women’s basketball team, were too isolated to support a
reasonable belief in a racially hostile work environment); Butts v. Ameripath, Inc., 794 F.
Supp. 2d 1277, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (suggesting, in dicta, that one-time exposure to
concededly offensive, racially insensitive emails was insufficient to support a reasonable
belief in a racially hostile environment); Mitchell v. Barnard Constr. Co., 107 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 661, 665 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (granting employer summary judgment on 42
U.S.C. § 1981 retaliation claim because coworker’s single racist remark referring to the
plaintiff as a “black monkey” did not support an objectively reasonable belief in a racially
hostile environment).
165. 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997).
166. Id. at 959–60.
167. Id.

2014]

RETALIATION IN AN EEO WORLD

143

the employer from liability for coworker harassment. Few employees would risk
reporting harassment if doing so might not only get them fired, but also leave them
without recourse for any ensuing retaliation.
The Little case was decided one year before the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Ellerth and Faragher, so it is not so surprising that the court did not consider how a
workplace policy on harassment might affect the reasonableness of the employee’s
response; such policies, though common in the workplace, were not yet on the
radar screen of courts deciding harassment cases. However, the court’s reasoning
makes employer policies irrelevant even now, despite their prominence and
integration into harassment liability standards. The Little decision and the cases
following it create an especially difficult situation for employees responding to
coworker harassment through employer anti-harassment policies.
The problems with the reasonable belief doctrine in these cases are compounded
by the sheer breadth of employer harassment policies. Employer policies on
harassment are much broader than the law’s approach to actionable harassment.168
As Vicki Schultz pointed out in her critique of employer responses to sexual
harassment law, employers prohibit conduct far exceeding what would violate the
law.169 The language in employer policies moves seamlessly from the legal
requirements of a harassment claim to much broader notions of incivility and
disrespect.170 Even where employer policies purport to track legal definitions of
harassment, the legal standards themselves are anything but precise. For example,
harassment policies often incorporate the definition from the 1980 EEOC
guidelines:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.171

168. See DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 201 (“The general anti-harassment policy might cover
activities not yet imagined by plaintiffs, but which would someday be forbidden by the
courts.”); id. at 204 (explaining that human resources experts counseled employers to adopt
harassment policies “forbidding behavior—a pat on the shoulder or romance between
colleagues—that no court had questioned”); id. at 201 (discussing breadth of employer
harassment policies, including one “designed to stop ‘any sort of disruptive or harassing
behavior’” (emphasis omitted)).
169. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2093–2103 (2003).
170. See, e.g., Rod P. Githens, Diversity and Incivility: Toward an Action-Oriented
Approach, 13 ADVANCES IN DEVELOPING HUM. RESOURCES 40, 40–41, 44 (2011) (referring
to “incivility” interchangeably with subtle forms of discrimination).
171. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(2012); see also DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 198 (noting that many employer policies on
sexual harassment incorporate the definition from the EEOC Guidelines); Michele M.
Hoyman & Jamie R. McCall, Sexual Harassment, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT, supra note 112, at 475, 478, 484–85 (admonishing
employers to adopt the 1980 EEOC definition of sexual harassment in their own policies on
sexual harassment).
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This language encompasses a much broader category of conduct than what a
court would necessarily find to be actionable. Even the relatively mild innuendos in
Breeden could arguably fall under this definition.172 Where employer policies offer
more concrete examples, the examples often include the kinds of isolated, offensive
comments courts dismiss as insufficient in the reasonable belief cases. Sexual
jokes, remarks, and gestures are often listed as among the kinds of behaviors
covered by harassment policies.173 Moreover, employer policies typically
encourage or even require employees to report any harassing behaviors right away,
without waiting for the incidents to accumulate until they become severe or
pervasive.174 In fact, a directive to wait to report until the harassment becomes
severe would be inconsistent with the reason why the law incentivizes having
harassment policies and why it behooves employers to have them: to stop harassing
behaviors before they violate the law. The bottom line is, the reasonable belief
cases do not account for how employer policies shape employee perceptions of, and
responses to, harassment in the workplace, to the peril of the employees who report
it.
2. Beyond Harassment: Other Discrimination Complaints
The harassment cases are just the tip of the Breeden iceberg. Sexual harassment
policies get the most attention, but employer nondiscrimination policies reach much
further than harassment, setting up the reasonable belief doctrine to clash with other
kinds of discrimination complaints as well. This tension between broadly worded
EEO policies and a strict application of the reasonable belief doctrine arises in
cases involving a wide range of discrimination complaints. Here too, the reasonable
belief cases fail to account for gaps between the scope of employer policies and the
narrower reach of discrimination law. Courts maintain their resolve that the
reasonableness of the employee’s perception of discrimination is measured against
the substantive law, unaffected by broader coverage in employer policies.
While harassment complaints appear the most frequently in the reasonable belief
cases, examples of other kinds of discriminatory practices can also be found in the
case law. In one such case, EEOC v. Kumi Manufacturing Alabama, LLC,175 the
court faulted the EEOC for failing to prove that an African American employee
held an objectively reasonable belief that he was opposing unlawful discrimination
when he objected to the employer’s use of written employment tests—specifically,
its accommodation of Hispanics but not African Americans with a modified oral
test. To rebut the reasonableness of the employee’s belief, the court cited case law
approving the use of written exams absent proof of a discriminatory intent or

172. While clearly not actionable under judicial precedents, the conduct arguably
included an unwelcome sexual comment and created an offensive working environment for
the plaintiff.
173. See, e.g., DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 198.
174. See, e.g., Hoyman & McCall, supra note 171, at 487 (advising employers to conduct
training on their sexual harassment policies and to “encourage victims to come forward
when genuine problems exist”).
175. No. 2:09-CV-260-WKN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3051 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2011).
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application against African Americans.176 Since the employee had no evidence that
the employer acted with a discriminatory intent, he was obliged to accept the
employer’s explanation that the accommodation was warranted only for Spanishspeaking employees. Accordingly, the court reasoned, the employer’s refusal to
offer the accommodation to African American test takers could not reasonably be
viewed as discriminatory under the governing law.177 As this case illustrates, the
reasonable belief test applies just as strictly to complaints about employer practices
with a disparate impact as it does to complaints about perceived harassment. EEO
policies and practices, however, have evolved to include broad oversight of
employer practices with a disparate impact, even beyond what is strictly required
by discrimination law.178
Complaints about disparate treatment in the workplace get the same treatment.
Indeed, there appear to be many ways the reasonable belief doctrine can ensnare an
unsuspecting complainant who is not steeped in the nuances of discrimination law.
Unfamiliarity with the materially adverse requirement is one of them. In Howard v.
Walgreen Co.,179 the appellate court invoked the reasonable belief doctrine to
overturn a jury verdict for the plaintiff on his retaliation claim, reversing the district
court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law. In this case, the flaw in the
underlying merits of the discrimination complaint was that the purportedly
discriminatory action did not rise to the level of material adversity required under
Title VII.180 The plaintiff, an African American pharmacist, had complained about
what he perceived as a racially discriminatory threat to terminate him in a message
left on his voicemail.181 In the message, his white supervisor threatened to fire him,
and the plaintiff had reason to believe that the threat was motivated by racial bias.
After he complained about the threatening message, he actually was fired.182 He
brought a retaliation claim and won before a jury. The appeals court overturned the
verdict, ruling that a discriminatory threat to fire an employee (as opposed to a later
termination) is not materially adverse. Since the threat was not materially adverse,
the plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that it violated Title VII.183 The court
did not mention the existence of an employer policy, but its reasoning makes plain

176. Id. at *30–31.
177. Id. at *35–37.
178. Stephen E. Condrey, Introduction: Toward Relevant Human Resource Management,
in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT, supra note 112, at
xxxix, xli–ii (detailing how human resources functions came to encompass a wide range of
employment practices monitoring diversity); Guy & Newman, supra note 112, at 167
(describing how human resources professionals oversee and implement selection processes
to “ensure that protected groups are not inadvertently or disproportionately screened out
during the hiring process”).
179. 605 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2010).
180. Id. at 1245.
181. Id. at 1241.
182. Id. at 1242.
183. Id. at 1245; see also Brokaw v. Weiser Sec., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1246 n.21 (S.D.
Ala. 2011) (stating, in dicta, that plaintiff’s opposition to the employer’s stated preference
for hiring male guards may have lacked a reasonable belief because the plaintiff did not
point to any actual hiring decision in which the stated preference was carried out).
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that even a broadly worded policy promising nondiscriminatory treatment in all
instances would have made no difference.
As these examples show, it is not just harassment complaints that get sacked by
the reasonable belief doctrine. The lower court cases have traveled far from the
facts in Breeden to deny protection to any complaints about discriminatory
practices that do not conform to the substantive law of discrimination.
3. Complaints Blurring the Boundary Between Affirmative Action and
Nondiscrimination
The boundary between nondiscrimination and affirmative action is an especially
thorny one for complainants. Courts have applied the reasonable belief doctrine
strictly, and with no regard for employer policies blurring these principles, to
employee complaints about the employer’s failure to implement an affirmative
action plan. Employer EEO policies and practices, however, often mix promises of
nondiscrimination with commitments to affirmative action.184 As Frank Dobbin
explains in his study of how personnel offices invented modern understandings of
employment discrimination, EEO staff merged their compliance strategies for
nondiscrimination with their affirmative action efforts.185 As a result, affirmative
action and nondiscrimination may be lumped together in the same policies and
administered by the same staff persons.186 The reasonable belief cases, however,
treat these obligations as separate and unrelated. Courts reject retaliation claims
involving complaints about the employer’s failure to implement affirmative action
plans for want of an objectively reasonable belief that an employer’s refusal to
engage in affirmative action violates Title VII.
In one of the first cases to take this approach, Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,187
the plaintiff, who managed the company’s affirmative action office, claimed that
she suffered retaliation for attempting to bring the employer into compliance with
the federal executive order requiring contractors with the federal government to
meet affirmative action goals and timetables.188 In a bench trial, the district court
ruled for the plaintiff, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding a lack of protected
activity because it was unreasonable to believe that failure to meet the affirmative
action requirements of the executive order violated Title VII.189 The court’s
reasoning posited a clear separation between affirmative action and
nondiscrimination, with only the latter required by Title VII.190

184. Norma M. Riccucci, Affirmative Action, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT, supra note 112, at 455, 469 (describing employer EEO
oversight in terms that merge nondiscrimination and affirmative action).
185. DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 14.
186. For a model policy where this is the case, see Riccucci, supra note 184, at 471–72
(presenting Exhibit 19.1 Sample Table of Contents and Language for an Affirmative Action
Plan for Midtown, USA).
187. 793 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1986).
188. Id. at 746.
189. Id. at 749.
190. See id. at 748–49.
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Subsequent cases have reached similar results. In Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola General
Bottlers, Inc.,191 the Sixth Circuit used similar reasoning to uphold summary
judgment for the employer in a retaliation claim brought by the company’s
affirmative action officer. The court followed Holden to rule that the plaintiff’s
efforts to increase the representation of women and minorities were not protected
activity under Title VII.192 Similarly, in Manoharan v. Columbia University
College of Physicians & Surgeons,193 the plaintiff’s complaints that the university
failed to follow its affirmative action goals and gave insufficient attention to
minority candidates in a particular hiring decision were not protected activities.194
In these and other cases, courts have labeled it unreasonable to believe that an
employer’s failure to follow its affirmative action goals violates Title VII.195
These decisions fail to recognize that the legal terrain separating affirmative
action from nondiscrimination is slippery at best. Judges and legal scholars alike
have struggled with the boundary between these two conceptions of equal
opportunity.196 Indeed, a small but notable body of legal precedent holds that the
knowing failure to take specific action to increase minorities’ or women’s
representation in the workplace might, in some circumstances, amount to
intentional discrimination.197 The uncertainty facing employees over where to draw
this line is compounded by employers merging the two concepts and their
requirements under the same policy. EEO policies generally locate responsibility
for both sets of obligations in the same office or person and cover both obligations
under common language in the same policies. The widely used self-identification
as an EEO employer has come to stand both for an employer who complies with
nondiscrimination requirements and for one who affirmatively undertakes to have a
diverse workforce that includes members of historically underrepresented groups.
Courts gloss over this complexity, and the role of employer policies in contributing
to it, when they label it unreasonable to pursue affirmative action goals under the
guise of opposing discrimination.

191. No. 90-5603, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 3856 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 1991) (per curiam).
192. Id. at *2.
193. 842 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1988).
194. Id. at 593–94.
195. See also Montgomery v. DePaul Univ., No. 10 C 78, 2012 U.S Dist. LEXIS 128206,
at *25–26 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2012) (advocating for greater diversity in university hiring was
not protected activity under the opposition clause because failure to engage in affirmative
action does not violate Title VII); cf. Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 575–80
(6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting district court’s ruling that plaintiff, director of the university
affirmative action office, lacked a reasonable belief that his opposition to the university’s
refusal to implement affirmative action violated Title VII but emphasizing that the plaintiff’s
advocacy was not limited to affirmative action and included opposition to discrimination in
hiring).
196. For a critique of Holden that expands upon the overlap in the substantive law
between the failure to implement affirmative action and discrimination, especially disparate
impact, see Floyd D. Weatherspoon, “Don’t Kill the Messenger”: Reprisal Discrimination
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 367.
197. See, e.g., EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2006).
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4. Complaints Challenging Discrimination Against Unprotected Groups
The reasonable belief case law is equally unforgiving when employees complain
about discrimination on the basis of a status that is not protected under federal
employment discrimination law. Employer nondiscrimination policies are often
much broader than the scope of discrimination law, promising equal opportunity to
groups left outside the protected categories of Title VII and other federal statutes.
This problem arises most often in the realm of sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination, since these characteristics are frequently covered by
employer policies but are outside the scope of federal employment discrimination
protections.
Courts routinely apply the reasonable belief doctrine to dismiss retaliation
claims where the underlying complaint involves discrimination based on sexual
orientation, an unprotected status under Title VII. In Hamner v. St. Vincent
Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc.,198 one of the earlier cases of this order, the
plaintiff, a gay man employed as a nurse, complained about harassment through the
hospital’s grievance procedure.199 The harassment included conduct by a supervisor
who mocked him by lisping, flipping his wrists, and making anti-gay jokes.200 The
plaintiff considered these behaviors to be sexual harassment, but the court
characterized this belief as unreasonable, viewing the harassment as targeting the
plaintiff’s sexual orientation.201 Since sexual orientation is not a protected class
under Title VII, the court reasoned, the complaint was not protected activity under
the opposition clause.202 Other than to note that the plaintiff pursued the complaint
through the employer’s grievance procedure, the court said nothing about the
hospital’s EEO policies—neither how the hospital defined sexual harassment nor
the scope of coverage in the policy and whether it extended to sexual orientation.203
Under the court’s reasoning, it would have made no difference if the employer’s
EEO policies had expressly included sexual orientation along with the protected
classes covered under Title VII, as many employer policies do.204 Indeed, courts
have ruled the same way despite the existence of employer policies specifically
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. In Higgins v. New Balance Athletic

198. 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000).
199. Id. at 703.
200. Id. at 703, 705–706.
201. Id. at 705.
202. Id. at 707.
203. See also Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066 (7th Cir.
2003) (opposing harassment based on sexual orientation is not protected under the
opposition clause because it is not unlawful under Title VII); Ogle v. Wal-Mart Stores E.,
LP, No. 2:09-CV-317-PPS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116212, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 23,
2011) (same).
204. See DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 201 (noting a personnel journal article showcasing the
anti-harassment policy for Madison, Wisconsin’s city workers, which prohibited harassment
based on “race, sex, religion, color, national origin, handicap, and sexual orientation”); id. at
144 (noting the expansion of protected categories beyond those in discrimination law in
employer diversity/EEO policies).
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Shoe, Inc.,205 the inclusion of sexual orientation in the employer’s
nondiscrimination policy did not help the plaintiff past the reasonable belief hurdle.
Although decided before Breeden, the court anticipated and applied the reasonable
belief requirement without regard to the broader coverage of protected groups
under the employer’s nondiscrimination policy.206
In recent years, more employers have added sexual orientation and gender
identity to their nondiscrimination policies.207 Employer EEO practices are
nowhere near as insistent as courts in delineating a sharp boundary between sex and
sexual orientation in overseeing fair employment practices. For example, a leading
text for human resources professionals describes a case in which an employee was
harassed for being “a gay female” as a case involving “sexual harassment.”208
However, courts continue to rule sexual orientation outside the protections of Title
VII.209 This gap between employer policies and Title VII coverage leaves
employees highly vulnerable to retaliation when they challenge bias against a group
that is included in the employer nondiscrimination policy but outside the
protections of employment discrimination law. Once again, courts strictly apply the
reasonable belief doctrine based on existing law, unmediated by the broader scope
of employer policies.
5. Complaints About the Treatment of Non-Employees
Complaints about the discriminatory treatment of non-employees have also
butted up against the reasonable belief doctrine. Courts have ruled unreasonable
employee understandings that extend nondiscrimination commitments to persons
who are not employed by the employer, such as clients or members of the
community. When these kinds of complaints are involved, courts use the
reasonable belief doctrine to draw a sharp line between the employer’s treatment of
its employees and the employer’s treatment of others. A recent case of this order,
Bonn v. City of Omaha,210 involved a complaint by a city employee whose job as
public safety auditor required her to review and audit citizen complaints about
police officers’ treatment of citizens. She lost her job after writing a report
criticizing the police department for tolerating racially biased policing practices. In

205. 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
206. See id. at 262 (“Certainly, the mere inclusion in the record of New Balance’s
internal policy against discrimination based on sexual orientation does not, as the appellant
now suggests, evidence either his state of mind or the reasonableness of his beliefs.”).
207. Brad Sears, Nan Hunter & Christy Mallory, Report Update: Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity Non-Discrimination Policies of the Top 50 Contractors, FY 2011, WILLIAMS
INST. (Apr. 2012), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Sears-Hunter
-Mallory-Report-Update-Top50-Contractors-April-2012.pdf (stating that 86% of top federal
contracting companies have employer nondiscrimination policies covering sexual orientation
and 55% of them cover gender identity).
208. Hoyman & McCall, supra note 171, at 475.
209. E.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006); Dawson v.
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001).
210. 623 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2010).
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the report, she chided the department’s lack of success in “recruiting or maintaining
a diverse workforce” and connected this failing to its poor relations with the
minority community.211 Rejecting her retaliation claim for lack of protected
activity, the court explained that racially biased policing was not an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII.212 Although the court did not disagree that
such practices might negatively affect the recruiting of minority officers, it found
the allegations “far too attenuated from actual employment practices” to support a
reasonable belief that the department was violating Title VII.213 Other courts have
used similar reasoning to reject retaliation claims by employees who complained
about police department bias against persons of color in the community.214
In ruling the plaintiff’s belief unreasonable, this approach overstates the degree
of attenuation between racial bias in policing and in the hiring of police officers.
For instance, the court in Bonn emphasized that the plaintiff did not allege that the
department intended to affect minority recruiting through its police practices.215
However, such tactics might nevertheless have a disparate impact on minority
applications that could plausibly form the basis for a Title VII disparate impact
claim. The court’s reasoning also ignores the possibility, recognized in early Title
VII case law, that the discriminatory treatment of clients can potentially create a
racially hostile environment for employees.216
Indeed, media coverage of the class action lawsuit against Denny’s, in which
African American customers challenged discriminatory service at the restaurant,
revealed links between discrimination against customers and the racial environment
for employees, connecting the all-white management team and a racially hostile
workplace to the discriminatory treatment of customers.217 The settlement, while
primarily focused on the restaurant’s relations with its customers, also included
provisions addressing race discrimination against employees.218 As the Denny’s
litigation illustrates, it is far from unreasonable to think that the racially
discriminatory treatment of clients and constituents is related to racial inequality in
employee work environments.

211. Id. at 591.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 592.
214. See, e.g., Wimmer v. Suffolk Cnty Police Dep’t, 176 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1999)
(plaintiff lacked a reasonable belief that police department’s discriminatory treatment of
civilians established an unlawful employment practice); Crowley v. Prince George’s Cnty,
890 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff’s investigation of police department’s alleged racial
harassment of the black community was not protected activity because he could have no
reasonable belief that this violated Title VII); cf. Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, 100 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1549 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (plaintiff could not have reasonably
believed that firefighters’ sexual harassment of members of the public violated Title VII).
215. 623 F.3d at 592.
216. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238–39 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing a claim for
hostile environment racial harassment based in part on employer’s racial segregation of
clientele in waiting room).
217. Bendick et al., supra note 105, at 21.
218. Id. at 21−22 (noting that the settlement increased the number of minority managers
and prompted company-wide diversity training).
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Most problematic, the court in Bonn did not consider how the employer’s
nondiscrimination policy might have influenced the plaintiff’s view that the city’s
nondiscrimination obligations included a duty to weed out practices that interfere
with the recruitment of a diverse workforce. The opinion is silent with respect to
the city’s internal policies, but as a public employer, the city likely had a detailed
EEO policy.219 Such policies often lump together loosely related promises of
nondiscrimination, equal employment opportunity, and a commitment to
diversity.220
A related collection of cases applies a similar principle to employees of
educational institutions complaining about perceived discrimination against
students.221 The court in Bonn cited some of them, noting with a tinge of
impatience, “[w]e have explained more than once that ‘opposing an employer’s
actions outside the ambit of an employment practice is unprotected by Title
VII.’”222 These cases draw a similar line, ruling that Title VII does not protect
employee complaints about the discriminatory treatment of students since it would
be unreasonable to believe that discrimination against students violates Title VII.223
These courts, too, make no reference to school or university nondiscrimination
policies, which may combine in the same policy the institution’s nondiscrimination
obligations toward faculty, staff, and students alike, and invite broad input and
participation from the educational community in securing these promises.224 After
the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson, an employee experiencing retaliation for
such complaints might still find protection under Title IX (for sex) or Title VI (for
race), even if not under Title VII. Nevertheless, the more holistic approach to
nondiscrimination reflected in the EEO policies of educational institutions belie
such a fine parsing of lines as to negate a Title VII retaliation claim protecting

219. An Internet search for related city personnel policies in Omaha turned up an
Executive Order declaring it city policy to promote diversity in city employment. Exec. Order
No. S-2-10, City of Omaha Statement of Zero Tolerance for Racism and Discrimination,
http://www.cityofomaha.org/humanresources/public-documents/executive-orders.
220. See DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 42 (explaining how EEO experts broadened
nondiscrimination mandates to encompass practices focusing on minority recruitment, and
that “[i]n choosing these interventions, personnel experts redefined the public’s
understanding of workplace discrimination”); id. at 72 (noting merger of nondiscrimination,
minority recruitment, and training programs in EEO compliance strategies).
221. E.g., Lamb-Bowman v. Del. State Univ., 152 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Del. 2001)
(complaints by plaintiff, head coach for women’s basketball program, about unequal
treatment of women’s teams were not protected activity under Title VII since discrimination
against students does not violate Title VII); Hill v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 93 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1134 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (employee’s complaint about perceived discrimination
against students was not protected activity under Title VII).
222. Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Artis v. Francis
Howell N. Band Booster Ass’n, 161 F.3d 1178, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998)).
223. Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 2007); Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band
Booster Ass’n, 161 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 1998); Evans v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d
98 (8th Cir. 1995).
224. See, e.g., UNIV. OF GA., NON-DISCRIMINATION AND ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICY (Nov.
28, 2012), available at http://eoo.uga.edu/pdfs/NDAH.pdf (applying to any member of the
university community).
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employee complaints about the discriminatory treatment of other members of the
educational community.
Through promises of diversity, broad definitions of equal employment
opportunity, and inclusive commitments of nondiscrimination toward all persons
served, EEO policies blur lines that discrimination statutes sharply and rigidly
enforce. As a result, employees who act on these promises to protect the rights of
nonemployees cross these lines at their peril.
6. The Factual Support Required to Complain
The reasonable belief doctrine requires not only support in the substantive law
but also sufficient facts to support an objectively reasonable belief that unlawful
discrimination has occurred. This too creates tensions with employer policies.
Employees risk being labeled unreasonable and left unprotected from retaliation for
stepping forward to complain about discrimination based on speculative reasons
without hard, cold facts to support them. And yet, employer EEO policies may
offer little guidance about the kinds of facts an employee should know before
complaining about discrimination and instead direct employees to report their
concerns through the specified channels without delay.225 Waiting to gather facts
takes time and may not be compatible with reporting problems as soon as they
arise.
The case law illustrates this bind. If the employee’s complaint objects to a form
of disparate treatment, the factual support for a legal challenge would require proof
that the employer acted with the kind of discriminatory intent the law requires. For
example, in Butler v. Raytel Medical Corp.,226 the plaintiff complained to the
company’s human resources department about what he perceived as racial
“favoritism” by his supervisor.227 The court rejected his retaliation claim, faulting
him for not having had a reasonable belief that discrimination occurred since he
“put forward little, if any, evidence of [his supervisor’s] racial animus” and “spoke
in vague terms and could not give details.”228 He lost the retaliation claim, in part,
for lack of the kind of factual record necessary to support an objectively reasonable
belief in discrimination.229 Similarly, in Woods v. Enlarged City School District,230
the court ruled that a female African American assistant principal’s complaint

225. See, e.g., N.Y. UNIV., NON-DISCRIMINATION AND ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICY AND
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES FOR EMPLOYEES (Aug. 12, 2012), available at http://www.nyu.edu
/about/policies-guidelines-compliance/policies-and-guidelines/anti-harassment-policy-and
-complaint-procedures.html (“Any employee who believes that he or she has been a victim
of discrimination . . . should immediately report the circumstances in accordance with the
procedure set forth below.”); id. (“The University encourages prompt reporting of
complaints . . . . Because it is not always easy to interpret words or actions, employees are
further encouraged to bring forward any concerns under this policy before they rise to the
level of violating the law.”).
226. No. 98 CV 6446 (SJ), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26023 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004).
227. Id. at *3.
228. Id. at *11.
229. Id.
230. 473 F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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about race discrimination was not supported by a reasonable belief because “the
record is devoid of any evidence showing racial animus or bias,” and “shows, at
most, that plaintiff was shamefully mistreated by a group of teachers who were
Caucasian and that her supervisor ineffectually handled the situation.”231 In such
cases, employees have no recourse for retaliation if they complain about perceived
discrimination without specific examples of more favorably treated comparators
who are outside of their protected class but are otherwise sufficiently similar to
support an inference of unlawful discrimination.232
Once again, the courts’ application of the reasonable belief doctrine does not
comport with how employer EEO policies approach employee complaints.
Employees are not all cut from the same cloth; they make inferences about
discrimination with varying levels of factual support.233 But employer policies do
not come with warnings to employees to wait to complain until they have adequate
factual support, nor do they instruct employees on what kind of factual record they
should compile before they complain. Rather, such policies openly invite
employees to come forward with any concerns based on their own perceptions.234
This presents a conflict with the stringency of the reasonable belief doctrine, which
requires the kind of factual support necessary to make a reasonable claim of
unlawful discrimination.
7. Special Problems for Supporting Witnesses in Internal EEO Processes
In addition to the gap between how courts understand discrimination and how
complainants who consult employer policies are likely to understand it, the
reasonable belief doctrine creates other difficulties in the EEO workplace as well.
Special problems arise when the retaliation is directed against an employee other
than the complainant who provides helpful information in the complaintinvestigation process. In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, Tennessee,235 the Supreme Court ruled that participating as a

231. Id. at 527.
232. See, e.g., Diamond v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 457 F. App’x 844 (11th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (complaints that white paralegals received better assignments were not
protected where complainant lacked knowledge of specific assignments given to white
employees); Muhammad v. Audio Visual Servs. Grp., 380 F. App’x 864 (11th Cir. 2010)
(complaint that overtime pay was calculated in a discriminatory manner lacked a reasonable
belief since complainant did not identify a similarly situated white comparator).
233. E.g., Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of
Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1315 (2012) (discussing research showing
that people’s backgrounds significantly affect their likelihood of making attributions to
discrimination based on a particular set of facts); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual
Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1127−31 (2008) (discussing studies showing racial
differences in inferring discrimination from a given set of facts).
234. See, e.g., Sample Anti-Discrimination and Harassment Policies, FINDLAW, http://
smallbusiness.findlaw.com/employment-law-and-human-resources/sample-anti-discrimination
-and-harassment-policies.html (“If an employee feels that he or she has been harassed on the
basis of his or her sex, race, national origin, ethic [sic] background, or any other legally
protected characteristic they should immediately report the matter to his or her supervisor.”).
235. 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
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supporting witness in an employer’s internal investigation of a discrimination
complaint is protected activity under Title VII’s opposition clause.236 The Court’s
ruling is surely correct, since leaving witnesses unprotected from retaliation would
call into question the very legitimacy of such processes and tear large loopholes in
the fabric of retaliation law. However, by deciding the case under the opposition
clause instead of the participation clause, the decision does not adequately protect
supporting witnesses, who still must clear the reasonable belief hurdle in order to
obtain protection. This was not a problem in Crawford itself since the sexual
harassment allegations clearly met the legal threshold for an actionable hostile
environment, but it is likely to pose problems in other cases.
Under Crawford, an employee who provides supporting statements in an
internal investigation into discrimination is only protected from retaliation if the
statements are based on an objectively reasonable belief that the underlying
conduct was actually unlawful.237 The same level of stringency with respect to the
governing substantive law and necessary factual support would still apply. These
difficulties are magnified when applied to corroborating witnesses in an employer’s
internal investigation. The employee may have little choice but to answer questions
and provide relevant information in such an investigation, and indeed, may be
required to do so under the employer’s discrimination policy.
Although few reported cases involve claims of retaliation against
noncomplainants under the opposition clause, so far courts have applied the
reasonable belief requirement unmodified in such settings. For example, in the preCrawford case of Barker v. Missouri Department of Corrections,238 the plaintiff
claimed retaliation after assisting another employee in making a discrimination
complaint. The plaintiff, a union shop steward, helped his male coworker file a
sexual harassment grievance. The court rejected the retaliation claim on the
grounds that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable belief that what happened to his
coworker was unlawful discrimination.239 The underlying allegations consisted of a
comment made to the coworker, a correctional officer in a women’s prison, by his
female supervisor, stating that he would need training to work in a particular unit
even though a female coworker did not because “women are better by and large as
they do a better job than men do anyway and are more patient and nurturing than
men and we have no complaints about them.”240
Consistent with other decisions applying the reasonable belief doctrine to
harassment complaints, this court explained that, even if offensive, this single
comment did not create an actionable hostile work environment for the male
coworker.241 Accordingly, any belief that it did was objectively unreasonable. What
stands out about this case is that the court applied the reasonable belief doctrine not
to the actual complainant, the target of the alleged harassment, but to the fellow
employee who assisted him in filing a grievance. The court’s reasoning would lead
to the same result if, instead of helping the coworker file a grievance, the plaintiff

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 273.
Id. at 276.
513 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 835.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 835.
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had testified truthfully in support of the coworker in an internal investigation. Like
the other reasonable belief cases discussed above, the court did not mention the
employer’s policies despite the likely existence of a collective bargaining
agreement.
When employer EEO policies establish complaint procedures and processes for
investigating complaints, employees other than the complainant may become
involved in the ensuing investigations. Even more so than the complainant, these
employees may not have enough factual or legal knowledge to objectively evaluate
the reasonableness of the underlying complaint. Applying the reasonable belief
doctrine to them, when they may have little choice but to participate in the
employer’s process, raises the same kinds of concerns that the Supreme Court
strived to avoid in the Crawford decision—it makes a mockery of EEO processes if
supportive witnesses are vulnerable to retaliation when the underlying complaint
lacks a sufficient legal or factual foundation. By leaving the claim under the
opposition clause, without any modification of the reasonable belief doctrine, the
Court failed to secure either the integrity of retaliation law or the legitimacy of the
EEO processes that the law so heavily incentivizes.
8. Concluding Thoughts on Causation, Complexity, and the Clash with EEO
Policies in the Reasonable Belief Doctrine
The strictness of the reasonable belief doctrine may well mask an unarticulated
concern in retaliation cases that the law not intrude too deeply into employer
prerogatives to base employment decisions on discretionary reasons—for example,
the employment at-will doctrine.242 On my reading of these cases, judicial
skepticism about the plaintiff’s ability to prove causation (that the adverse action
stemmed from a retaliatory reason) pervades the reasonable belief cases. Indeed, in
many of the cases discussed above, the facts on causation do appear quite weak for
the plaintiff. After a close reading of these decisions, I am left with the impression
that the courts’ disbelief of a retaliatory motive is a driving force behind the
stringency of the reasonable belief doctrine. In this vein, courts may be more
tentative about granting summary judgment and motions to dismiss for lack of
causation, which is almost always a contested issue of fact, and more comfortable
deciding them on the threshold question of whether the plaintiff engaged in
protected activity, which is a question of law.243
And yet, the application of the reasonable belief doctrine to determine whether
the plaintiff engaged in protected activity purports to be a discrete and prior issue,
separate from causation.244 As it should be. The reasonable belief doctrine is a poor

242. This same concern also pervades the Supreme Court’s recent Nassar decision. See
Grossman & Brake, supra note 1.
243. Lower courts have, however, rejected Seventh Amendment objections to resolving
disputes about causation in retaliation cases in granting employers’ motions for summary
judgment. See Schechter v. Ga. State Univ., 341 F. App’x 560, 562–63 (11th Cir. 2009); Hill
v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2005); Pospisil v. O’Reilly Auto, Inc., 619 F.
Supp. 2d 614, 622, 629–30 (N.D. Iowa 2007).
244. For a pre-Nassar summary laying out the basic framework of how courts determine
causation in retaliation cases, see George, supra note 146, at 458−59. After Nassar,
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proxy for addressing weaknesses in the plaintiff’s proof of causation. This is
especially so where the subject of the plaintiff’s complaint falls within the scope of
the employer’s EEO policies. There is no obvious reason why retaliation would be
less likely to trigger an adverse action when the complaint falls within the scope of
the employer’s nondiscrimination policy, though not within judicial interpretations
of discrimination law, than when the complaint meets the legal and factual
requirements for proving discrimination. Concerns about causation should be dealt
with forthrightly and transparently, instead of bleeding into the threshold
determination of whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity.
Whatever the reason for the stringency with which lower courts are applying
this doctrine, courts are quick to reject employees’ broader understanding of
nondiscrimination rights and emphatically recite the principle that the
reasonableness of employee beliefs is measured solely by the contours of existing
law. As one court put it, in finding the plaintiffs’ beliefs that they were opposing
discrimination unreasonable, the plaintiffs “called attention to no statutory or case
law that can reasonably be believed” to support their understanding.245 Other courts
put it even more bluntly: “A plaintiff may not stand on his ignorance of the
substantive law to argue that his belief was reasonable.”246 This articulation of
reasonableness as capped by the content of the governing law imposes a false
clarity on the meaning of discrimination. Lacking any fixed or easily discernible
meaning, the law’s promise of nondiscrimination can accommodate a broad range
of understandings, as it has at various points in history.247 Members of “outsider”
groups in particular—people of color, women, and sexual minorities—tend to take
a broader view of the definition of discrimination and to perceive it more frequently
in comparison to more powerful social groups, whose views are more likely to
match those held by judges.248
Most importantly, courts’ insistence on judging reasonableness by a strict legal
meaning does not take into account how employer policies shape employees’
understandings of their rights at work. As a result, employers reap the legal and
professional benefits of EEO policies without bearing legal responsibility for
causation remains a discrete issue, but employees are now restricted to the but-for method of
proof and may not proceed on an alternative mixed motive theory of causation. See Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
245. Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 857 (11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the
reasonableness of plaintiffs’ belief that they were opposing unlawful religious discrimination
by refusing to remove a religious picture from the workplace).
246. Mitchell v. Barnard Constr. Co., 107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 661, 664 (S.D.
Fla. 2009); see also Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that reasonable belief is an objective standard that is measured against the
content of existing law); Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 n.2 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“If the plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the substantive law, the
reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than speculation regarding their subjective
knowledge.”).
247. George Rutherglen, Concrete or Abstract Conceptions of Discrimination? (Univ. of
Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2012-58),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148435; see also George
Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of
Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006).
248. See Robinson, supra note 233, at 1107−39.
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retaliation against the employees who use them. While courts limit protection from
retaliation to those internal complaints that match their own narrow legalistic
conceptions of discrimination, much broader employer policies have expanded
popular understanding of the meaning of discrimination.249 The resulting
incongruity is not so much because companies are more progressive than the law,
although some may be, but because many employers have recognized that strong
EEO policies promote their self-interest. They offer some measure of “bulletproofing” from discrimination lawsuits and provide mechanisms for holding
employees accountable for failing to meet company norms and professional
expectations.
The reasonable belief cases have utterly failed to grapple with the realities of
employer EEO policies and their effect on employee understandings of
discrimination and responses to it.250 Even when courts mention the existence of an
employer policy, the scope, language, and promises of the policy have no bearing
on the court’s reasonable belief analysis. This is a glaring hole in the reasonable
belief case law given the role that EEO policies play in the modern workplace. In
the reasonable belief case law, it is as if the revolution in EEO policies, catalyzed
and accelerated by the Faragher and Ellerth decisions over fifteen years ago, has
never taken place.
B. Communicating Opposition: Discrimination Versus General Unfairness
The reasonable belief doctrine is not the only challenge retaliation law faces in
coming to terms with the EEO workplace. Another retaliation doctrine that clashes
with employer EEO policies is the requirement that employee opposition to
discrimination be expressed in terms that are clear and specific enough to put the
employer on notice that the complaint is about discrimination in particular and not
more generalized concerns about workplace fairness. Certainly, requiring some
degree of specificity under the opposition clause is appropriate. An employee
should not be protected from retaliation under an antidiscrimination statute for
complaining that meetings should end at five o’clock instead of six o’clock even if
the employee’s real concern is that the meetings were scheduled to penalize
working mothers. Employers must be able to comprehend the nature of the
complaint in order to determine and comply with the obligation not to retaliate. The
problem is that, as some courts have applied it, the requirement of employer

249. DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 7−8 (“Legal consciousness often corresponds not to black
letter law but to social ideas about what should be lawful, and so it is not just that case law
changed over time, but that notions of what should be lawful changed. . . . Employees
thought that the law must protect rights they believed they should have. . . . Americans came
to view as unlawful what personnel manuals prohibited.”).
250. For an all-too rare counterexample, see Nuskey v. Hochberg, 657 F. Supp. 2d 47, 61
(D.D.C. 2009) (“If plaintiff relied on an EEO training to conclude that Title VII had been
violated, her belief was in good faith and was not unreasonable—even if her conclusion
ultimately proved to be incorrect.”). Although the court’s statement of this principle is
reassuring, notably this was not a case where the EEO training lulled the plaintiff into a
broader understanding of discrimination than that supported in the law.
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knowledge demands a more precise terminology than employees use when they
follow employer policies to voice their concerns about discrimination.
Employer policies often address equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in
broad terms of professionalism, respect, and fairness. As Frank Dobbin explains,
when personnel departments took over the implementation of EEO mandates, they
incorporated systems to promote fairness and merit under the equal opportunity
mantle.251 In the 1980s, the terminology of equal opportunity and
nondiscrimination was rebranded under more general headings like “human
resources” and “diversity management.”252 As a result, instead of helping plaintiffs
over the notice/specificity hurdle, the language of EEO policies can steer
employees down a path that jeopardizes their protection from retaliation for
complaining about matters that the employee perceives as discriminatory, but
describing their complaints in more general terms.
When a discrimination complaint is pursued through an official statutory
enforcement mechanism (by filing a charge with the EEOC or a lawsuit in court),
and therefore falls under the participation clause, notice of the discrimination
complaint is provided to the employer through that process itself. But when a
complaint is made directly to the employer, and therefore falls under the opposition
clause, retaliation law requires enough specificity to inform the employer that the
complainant is asserting statutory nondiscrimination rights. All of the statutes
protecting discrimination complainants from retaliation share this requirement.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, which includes the Equal Pay
Act, courts have emphasized that “not all ‘abstract grumblings’ or vague
expressions of discontent” amount to the kind of protected activity necessary to
support a retaliation claim.253 The notice requirement for opposition under Title
VII’s retaliation provision is similar. As the Third Circuit explains it: “A general
complaint of unfair treatment is insufficient to establish protected activity under
Title VII.”254
While this requirement is sound in theory, depending on how it is applied and on
how the employer’s policies shape and channel grievances, it may ensnare
employees who use the terminology of human resources and EEO policies to
express their complaints instead of the rights-claiming language of the underlying
statutes. For example, in Barber v. CSX Distribution Services,255 the court ruled
that a letter sent by the plaintiff to the company’s human resources department was
not protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because, in
complaining that a position was filled with a less-qualified person, the letter did not

251. DOBBIN, supra note 94 passim.
252. Id. at 133, 143−44.
253. Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008) (using this
terminology to describe the notice requirement and faulting plaintiff because “he did not
frame any of his objections in terms of the potential illegality”); see also Valerio v. Putnam
Assocs., 173 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Of course, not all abstract grumblings will suffice
to constitute the filing of a complaint with one’s employer.”).
254. Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d
Cir. 2006).
255. 68 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 1995).

2014]

RETALIATION IN AN EEO WORLD

159

specify age discrimination as the reason.256 In the letter, the employee stated that he
had twenty-one years of experience in the field, which exceeded that of the “less
qualified individual” who got the job.257 The letter did not mention the selected
employee’s age (forty-four), however. The court construed the letter as a complaint
“about unfair treatment in general,” explaining that it expressed “dissatisfaction
with the fact that someone else was awarded the position, but it does not
specifically complain about age discrimination.”258 As a result, the letter was “too
vague” to establish protected activity under the statute.259 No mention was made of
the employer’s nondiscrimination policy or how it may have shaped how the
employee expressed his grievance.
The case is similar to others requiring employees to specify bias against a
protected class in order to gain statutory protection from retaliation for opposing
discrimination. Expressing a general complaint about fairness or injustice is not
enough. In Graham v. Methodist Home for the Aging,260 for example, the plaintiff’s
internal complaint in which she accused the employer of replacing her for speaking
out about “injustices” was not specific enough to support her retaliation claim.
Although her prior history with the employer included instances in which she had
challenged racial bias on behalf of herself and others, the court reasoned that her
reference to having spoken out about “injustices” was too vague, faulting her for
not mentioning “race” or “discrimination,” as the opposition clause requires.261
Another example of how insufficient specificity of a protected class derails the
retaliation claim is Miller v. American Family Mutual Insurance.262 In that case, the
plaintiff was paid less than any other employee in her position or in her department,
including some colleagues she helped train. When she learned of this disparity, she
confronted her supervisor and asked whether it was because she had been pregnant
and had taken pregnancy leave.263 The supervisor said nothing in reply, but
allegedly turned away and slammed a drawer. The next year, the plaintiff met with
this same supervisor and one other manager and again protested her pay. In this
meeting, she strenuously objected to being paid less than her coworkers, noting that
she had trained some of them, but did not again mention her suspicion that
pregnancy might be the reason.264 The court ruled that the plaintiff’s complaints
about her pay at that meeting were not protected activity because she did not make
clear that she was alleging pregnancy discrimination.265 While an employee “need
not use the words ‘pregnancy discrimination’ to bring her speech within Title VII’s
retaliation protections,” the court explained, “she has to at least say something to

256. Id. at 701–02.
257. Id. at 697.
258. Id. at 701.
259. Id. at 702.
260. No. 2:11-CV-1416-SLB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117194 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 20, 2012).
261. Id. at *66−67.
262. 203 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2000).
263. Id. at 1001.
264. Id. at 1001−02.
265. The earlier conversation, in which she did mention pregnancy, could not be causally
linked to the termination, so the retaliation claim depended on this second conversation as
the protected activity. Id. at 1005 n.6.
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indicate her pregnancy is an issue.”266 The court rejected as speculative the
plaintiff’s “subjective belief” that the supervisors already knew that her complaints
about pay “‘centered around’ her belief of pregnancy discrimination,”
notwithstanding her earlier question linking the two.267
Other plaintiffs have also lost retaliation claims for opposing pay inequality
without specifically mentioning pay discrimination based on a protected class
status. In Hunt v. Nebraska Public Power District,268 the plaintiff had complained
about receiving lower pay despite taking on extra responsibilities that had been
handled by higher-paid men.269 The court upheld the dismissal of her retaliation
claim for lack of protected activity, ruling that her protestations about her pay did
not specifically mention sex discrimination as the cause of the pay disparity that
she challenged.270
These cases keep company with others rejecting generalized complaints about
unfair treatment as a trigger for retaliation protections. In Galdieri-Ambrosini v.
National Realty & Development Corp.,271 the plaintiff, a secretary, had complained
about having to perform personal tasks for her male boss and about the more
favorable treatment given to other secretaries.272 Her theory behind her sex
discrimination complaint was that she was punished for failing to conform to
gender stereotypes about how secretaries should comport themselves in the
workplace.273 She sued for both gender discrimination and retaliation and won a
jury verdict of $100,000 for combined compensatory and punitive damages. The
lower court granted judgment as a matter of law for the defendant and the appellate
court affirmed.274 In rejecting the retaliation claim, the court faulted the plaintiff for
not notifying her employer that she was complaining about sex discrimination
specifically, as opposed to unfair treatment in general. Since she did not articulate
her internal complaints in terms of sex discrimination, she did not sufficiently
communicate her opposition to an unlawful employment practice under Title
VII.275 This is a common refrain, that an employee must assert bias against a
protected class in order to find protection from retaliation under the opposition
clause.276

266. Id. at 1007−08.
267. Id. at 1008 n.9.
268. 282 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 2002).
269. Id. at 1024.
270. Id. at 1028−29.
271. 136 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 1998).
272. Id. at 280–81.
273. Id. at 282−83.
274. Id. at 284−85, 292.
275. Id. at 292.
276. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Opelika, 211 F. App’x 862, 864 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (complaint about supervisor’s harassing behavior was not protected because plaintiff
“never mentioned the word ‘race’” or racial discrimination); Sitar v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp.,
344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff’s complaint that she felt “picked on” did not
apprise employer that she was complaining of sex discrimination); Genosky v. Minnesota,
244 F.3d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2001) (complaint about “unfair treatment” was not protected
activity where plaintiff never mentioned sex discrimination); Van Orden v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1063−64 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (plaintiff’s complaints
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In communicating bias against a protected class, clarity is prized, and veiled
references to discrimination are disfavored. In Boyd v. Honda Manufacturing. of
Alabama, LLC,277 for example, an African American employee did not engage in
protected activity under the opposition clause when he complained to his employer
about the selection process, unequal training, and disparities in overtime and job
assignments. Despite his reference to being “treated as a black sheep” of the
department, his complaints were not protected activity because he did not “mention
discrimination based on his race.”278
Much like the reasonable belief cases, courts fail to consider how the employer’s
nondiscrimination policies influence the employee’s communication of his or her
concerns and the language used to complain. The cases rarely mention the
existence of employer EEO policies in applying the notice requirement, much less
incorporate them into the legal analysis. In Boyd, the case in which the employee
complained of unequal treatment and being treated as a “black sheep,” the court did
acknowledge the existence of a company nondiscrimination policy but did not
connect the policy to its analysis of the notice requirement. Had it done so, the
court may have been more accepting of the employee’s more general way of
communicating his grievance. The very title of the policy suggests a merging of the
employer’s promises of nondiscrimination with a more general conception of
fairness: the “Equal Employment Opportunity and Mutual Respect Policies.”279
Without giving further details, the court described the policy as “prohibit[ing] any
form of discrimination in all terms and conditions of employment, including, but
not limited to, discrimination based upon race, sex, and age,” and any “retaliation
against an associate who reports a concern about discrimination.”280 It further noted
that the policy requires an employee “who believes he or she has witnessed or been
subject to discrimination or harassment to immediately report it” to a designated
person.281 Given the “including but not limited to” language in the policy and the
broad-sounding title, an employee might reasonably construe the policy as being
open-ended enough to sweep beyond the narrow set of employment practices made
unlawful under discrimination law. Moreover, nothing about the court’s description
of the policy suggests that it made employees aware of the importance of
specifying whether their concern was about unlawful discrimination on the basis of
a protected class or some more general maltreatment, such as a lack of respect.

about unfair treatment of two African American employees, without mentioning race, did not
communicate opposition to race discrimination).
277. 111 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1286 (N.D. Ala. 2010).
278. Id. at 1290–91, 1296. Courts impose stringent clarity requirements on employees
articulating complaints of violations under the Family Medical Leave Act as well. See Cook
v. CTC Commc’ns. Corp., No. 06-cv-58-JD, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96979 at *30–31
(D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2007) (finding that plaintiff’s opposition to FMLA violations were only
“abstract grumblings,” even though she referenced the FMLA by name, because she
“spoke . . . only generally about unlawful terminations”).
279. Boyd, 111 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1289; see also DOBBIN, supra note 94, at
16 (explaining how EEO personnel merged legal requirements of nondiscrimination with
broader notions of fairness).
280. Boyd, 111 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1289.
281. Id.
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Complaints about harassment are especially likely to get swept up in the lack-ofspecificity net. Numerous cases involve complaints of harassing and disrespectful
conduct that fall short of what is required for “protected activity” because they fail
to specify the plaintiff’s protected class as the basis for the harassment. For
example, in Smith v. International Paper Co.,282 an African American employee’s
complaint to the employer’s human resources department about workplace
“civility” problems and “harassment” by his white supervisor were not specific
enough to signal that he was complaining about racial harassment or race-based
discrimination.283 Other complaints of harassment, lacking specification of a
protected class, have met a similar fate.284 Employer policies, however, often
combine discriminatory harassment, including racial and sexual harassment, with
broader references to collegiality, respect, and professionalism.285
In addition to the hurdle of specifying a protected class in order to meet the
specificity requirement, the employee must also communicate the specific
employment actions or practices that the employee believes are discriminatory.
This too poses a problem for employees whose communications are less precise
than what courts require. For example, in Dupont-Lauren v. Schneider (USA),
Inc.,286 the plaintiff complained to her supervisor “about the difficulties of being a
female in the company.”287 The reference to being female surely indicated that the
complaint concerned conduct affecting the plaintiff because of her protected class.
The court nevertheless granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim for lack
of protected activity because the plaintiff’s statements about the difficulties facing
women in the company were vague and did not identify any particular employment
practice as discriminatory.288 Employer terminology in EEO matters, however,
often steers employees away from the rights-claiming language of discrimination
and toward more general and diffuse labels like “diversity.”289
Other cases also involve complaints that could be reasonably construed as
alleging bias against a protected class but are denied protection for failing to
specify an unlawful employment practice. In Pope v. ESA Services, Inc.,290 the
plaintiff, a black male of Liberian descent, did not engage in protected conduct
when he prefaced his inquiry expressing interest in being moved up to a
management level position with the observation that there were no black district
managers in the region.291 Because he did not attribute the absence of black
managers to a discriminatory practice, the court ruled that he did not oppose an

282. 523 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2008).
283. Id. at 849–50.
284. See, e.g., Jeronimus v. Polk Cnty. Opportunity Council, Inc., 145 F. App’x 319, 322,
326 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that an email complaining of being “unjustly singled out,” “a
campaign of harassment,” and “a truly hostile environment” was not protected activity where
the plaintiff made no mention of race).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 169–74.
286. 994 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
287. Id. at 811.
288. Id. at 823.
289. DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 16.
290. 406 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2005).
291. Id. at 1010.

2014]

RETALIATION IN AN EEO WORLD

163

unlawful employment practice.292 And in Rone v. U.S. Sprint,293 the court ruled that
the plaintiff’s expression of offense at racial insensitivity by the company was not
sufficiently connected to any unlawful employment practice by the employer.294 In
that case, the plaintiff was terminated after complaining to the human resources
department about an internal company newsletter using racially insensitive terms to
describe a company training program in which the plaintiff participated. The
newsletter described the training program, “which consisted entirely of minorities,
targeted members of the Kansas City urban community who were welfare
recipients or rehabilitated drug users.”295 The plaintiff complained that the article
was offensive, but she did not accuse the company of any particular unlawful
employment practice.296 Accordingly, the court ruled, her complaint was not
protected activity.297
A final example of a plaintiff’s failure to link a complaint about the treatment of
a protected class to an unlawful employment action comes from Hill v. IGA Food
Depot.298 In that case, the court ruled that the plaintiff, an African American
grocery store clerk, did not engage in protected activity when he asked his
supervisor why the store had so few African American cashiers. The court
explained, a plaintiff must “at the very least, communicate [his] belief that
discrimination is occurring to the employer. It is not enough for the employee
merely to complain about a certain policy . . . and rely on the employer to infer that
discrimination has occurred.”299 The court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s inquiry
was “about race,” but viewed it as merely “asking a question about race or
suggesting the desirability of diversity,” and “a far cry from alleging that an
employee or the company is intentionally refusing to hire African-Americans.”300
The court added that the plaintiff’s questioning was motivated by “personal
reasons,” since his daughter had applied for a cashier position.301 However, there is
no support in the statute for according a lower level of protection to opposition that
is personally motivated rather than principled, even if such an elusive distinction
could be drawn. Nor do employer policies make such a distinction in encouraging
employees to come forward with concerns about discrimination. Regardless of the
plaintiff’s motivation for complaining, courts require complaints to do more than
specify a protected form of bias; the complaint must link the bias to a particular
practice being challenged.302

292. Id.
293. 49 F. App’x 659 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
294. Id. at 660.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 660−61.
297. Id.
298. No. 2:04-cv-00966-WKW-VPM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80455 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 2,
2006).
299. Id. at *17−18 (quoting Webb v. R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (S.D.
Fla. 1998)).
300. Id. at *18−19.
301. Id. at *19.
302. E.g., Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir.
1989) (plaintiff’s accusations of his supervisor’s “ethnocism” and racist remark were too
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Some courts have taken the notice requirement one step further to insist not only
that employees specify a protected class and complain about a particular
employment practice, but also that they express a conclusion that the practice is
indeed unlawful. In Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC,303
the court ruled that the plaintiff’s complaints about allegedly preferential treatment
by the Korean-owned company of its Korean employees were too ambiguous to
qualify as protected activity under Title VII. To be protected, the court explained,
the plaintiff must make clear his belief that what he is complaining about is actually
unlawful.304 In that case, the plaintiff had expressed opposition to what he
perceived as the preferential treatment of Korean employees but did not explicitly
state a belief that the preferential treatment was national origin discrimination in
violation of Title VII. As the court explained, “it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to alert
Defendant that, not only is he complaining about unequal treatment, but that he also
believes that the root cause of the unequal treatment is a form of discrimination
prohibited by Title VII.”305 While courts offer general disclaimers that an employee
“need not refer to the statute by name,”306 this kind of reasoning comes awfully
close to requiring that very thing.
Despite the pervasiveness of employer EEO policies, the case law fails to
consider how the notice requirement comports with the way employer policies
channel and frame employee complaints. Much sociolegal research demonstrates
that workplace policies and cultures significantly affect how employees perceive
and respond to discrimination.307 Strict notice requirements are in tension with EEO
policies that lump together discrimination under broader promises of workplace
fairness and eschew rights-claiming language about discrimination for the
managerial language preferred by human resources staff.308 Employer policies
blend nondiscrimination guarantees with more general concerns about fairness and
diversity, without any cautionary instruction to employees about the importance of
preserving their rights against retaliation and articulating specific complaints about
vague to be protected activity).
303. No. 2:07cv144-ID, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33826 (M.D. Ala. April 24, 2008).
304. Id. at *29.
305. Id. at *32.
306. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999); cf. EEOC v. Romeo
Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff engaged in protected
activity when she “told them she believed they were ‘breaking some sort of law’ by paying
her lower wages than previously paid to male temporary custodians”).
307. E.g., Hirsh & Kornrich, supra note 87, at 1394 (stating that variations in workplace
conditions and institutional factors influence how workers perceive discrimination, their
rights, and whether they make a complaint); cf. Barry M. Goldman, The Application of
Referent Cognitions Theory to Legal-Claiming by Terminated Workers: The Role of
Organizational Justice and Anger, 29 J. MGMT. 705, 720 (2003) (discussing the tendency of
employer procedures, when perceived as fair, to “mitigate a worker’s legal-claiming
behavior that may otherwise be expected to result when termination is accompanied by
interactionally unjust treatment”).
308. See DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 94 (quoting TWA’s 1980 grievance procedure and
explanation of its purpose “to assure that the policies of the Company are applied to its
employees in [a] fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory fashion”); Goltz, supra note 110, at
763−97 (noting the use of a cautious voice when women do report/complain in a study of
women’s experiences using internal complaint procedures to challenge discrimination).
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discrimination.309 Instead, the policies steer employees toward more general
terminologies, which employees internalize and use in expressing their concerns.310
Complaints about what might be labeled “discrimination” are channeled into more
general complaints about unfair treatment and interpersonal conflicts.311 Employee
training programs reinforce this by going beyond conveying legal rules against
discrimination to include broader kinds of diversity training.312 Instead of
cautioning plaintiffs to take care in identifying discrimination, employer policies
use directive language instructing employees to report their concerns under broad
headings that lump potentially actionable complaints in with other grievances.
When employee complaints are successfully channeled in this way, they lose out on
the protections of retaliation law.
Together, these two doctrines make for a troubling disconnect between
retaliation law and the realities of EEO governance. The concluding section
considers some of the implications of this mismatch and sketches the outlines of a
proposal for resolving them.
IV. TWO DOCTRINAL FIXES AND A CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
Unless retaliation law catches up with the integrated role employer policies and
complaint processes play in the overall legal framework of employment
discrimination law, the Supreme Court’s pro-plaintiff cases and exhortations about
the importance of retaliation protections will have a hollow ring. Two fixes would
go a long way toward securing the integrity of retaliation law against the
background of EEO realities, without requiring statutory amendment or reversal of
any Supreme Court decision.
First, it is time to recognize that the sharp split between internal and external
complaints as the dividing line between Title VII’s opposition and participation
clauses no longer makes sense. Placing internal EEO complaints under the
participation clause, instead of casting them off to the weaker protections of the
opposition clause, would avoid the harshness of the reasonable belief doctrine since

309. See, e.g., Claire Armstrong, Patrick C. Flood, James P. Guthrie, Wenchuan Liu,
Sarah MacCurtain & Thadeus Mkamwa, The Impact of Diversity and Equality Management
on Firm Performance: Beyond High Performance Work Systems, 49 HUM. RESOURCES
MGMT. 977, 978 (2010) (using the terminology of “diversity and equality management
systems” and explaining how the term “equal opportunity” came to encompass broader
concepts than antidiscrimination).
310. See Edelman, Rivers of Law, supra note 93, at 191; see also Hirsh & Kornrich,
supra note 87, at 1398 (discussing how the organizational environment affects worker
perceptions of discrimination, and observing that managers often dissuade employees from
perceiving problems in terms of discrimination and seek to recast them in terms of fairness,
professionalism, and personality).
311. Estlund, supra note 106, at 336 (“Internal grievance processes . . . tend to assimilate
complaints of discrimination to other complaints of unfair treatment, and indeed to the
ordinary run of personnel conflicts.”); see also Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule,
supra note 90, at 899 (stating that “internal dispute handlers tend to recast discrimination
complaints as typical managerial problems (e.g., poor management or interpersonal
difficulties) rather than as legal violations”).
312. Bendick et al., supra note 105, at 10−11.
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only subjective, good-faith participation is required by the participation clause. It
would also avoid the problems of the notice/specificity requirement if courts treated
notice of a complaint brought pursuant to an employer policy that covers
discrimination as sufficient notice for protected activity, much as they do for
externally filed complaints under the participation clause.
Using the participation clause for internal complaints pursuant to employer
discrimination policies would recognize the extent to which such policies have
become integrated into the legal framework of employment discrimination law.
Only the most formalistic reading of the participation clause supports excluding
internal complaints from the protections of that clause.
A recent case from the Second Circuit typifies the reasoning lower courts have
used to exclude internal complaint processes from the participation clause. In
Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises,313 the plaintiff, a human resources director,
alleged that she was fired for conducting an investigation into an employee’s
charge that she was sexually harassed by the company vice president.314 Since the
plaintiff had not yet completed the investigation when she was fired, and therefore
could not have had a reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination occurred, she
chose to forego a claim under the opposition clause and instead sought the
protections of the participation clause.315 The Second Circuit rejected this claim,
joining the other lower courts that have ruled on this issue in reading the
participation clause as not encompassing internal complaints.316
Under this view, the language of the participation clause, which protects an
employee “because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter,”317 refers
only to the enforcement mechanisms codified in the statute—that is, filing a charge
with a government enforcement agency or suing in court.318 Like other circuit
courts, the court in Townsend read this language to exclude any internal complaint
process that takes place in the absence of a formal charge filed with the EEOC or
parallel state enforcement agency.319 Despite the unanimity on this point in the
lower courts, the Supreme Court has left this an open issue; in allowing the claim in
Crawford to proceed under the opposition clause, the Court specifically left
undecided the question of whether internal employer investigations of
discrimination complaints might fall within the participation clause.320 Recognizing
coverage under the participation clause would best serve the goals the Court has
identified in ensuring a workable statutory enforcement scheme.

313. 679 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012).
314. Id. at 46.
315. Id. at 48.
316. Id. at 49 (citing authorities).
317. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
318. Townsend, 679 F.3d at 48–49.
319. Id. at 49. Indeed, the court left open the possibility that participation in an
employer’s internal EEO processes may not fall under the participation clause even if it were
preceded by the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC. Id. at 48 n.6; see also Hatmaker v.
Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2010) (reserving judgment on this question).
320. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 280 (2008).
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The lower courts’ reading of the participation clause divorces the lodging of
formal complaints from the liability rules courts have crafted to decide them. This
approach treats statutory interpretation, regulatory guidance, and everyday
employer practices for complying with the law as not “law” at all and therefore not
operating “under this subchapter.” Their narrow, technical reading of the
participation clause contrasts with the purposive approach taken by the Supreme
Court in its retaliation decisions, which places a premium on the effectiveness and
workability of the statute. Unless the gaps in retaliation doctrine are closed, any
triumph of pragmatism over formalism will bypass the employees who address
concerns about discrimination through the internal EEO processes their employers
have set up to capitalize on the legal incentives for creating such processes.
The more purposive reading of the participation clause advocated here is not
foreclosed by the literal text of the clause.321 Although Congress may not have
originally intended internal employer investigations and complaint processes to fall
within that clause,322 it could not have foreseen the proliferation and subsequent
connection of such policies, through judicial interpretation, to the official
enforcement scheme established by the statute. So far, lower courts have failed to
appreciate that their narrower reading reflects an interpretive choice, not only about
how to read the participation clause, but also about whether to acknowledge the
role played by employer EEO policies in the enforcement of discrimination law.
As employer EEO processes have become more integral to statutory
enforcement, the sharp split between the participation and opposition clauses has
become increasingly anachronistic. The existence of employer policies for handling
employee complaints about discrimination is now firmly embedded in the liability
rules crafted by the Court for harassment claims specifically, and more generally
with respect to punitive damages, for all kinds of discrimination claims. Employer
EEO policies are also expressly encouraged by the EEOC, and as sociolegal
scholarship discussed above demonstrates, these policies greatly influence both
courts and the EEOC in their determinations of whether the employer complied
with the law. These policies also operate in the workplaces to set the norms and
expectations for employee nondiscrimination rights at work. Treating employer
EEO processes as outside of Title VII’s statutory enforcement framework does not
comport with their place in employment discrimination law or with the Supreme
Court’s purposive approach to statutory interpretation in its retaliation decisions.
Roping internal complaints into the participation clause would also better
comport with the law’s incentives for voluntary compliance. Otherwise, the broader
retaliation protections of the participation clause create the incentive for employees
to bypass internal complaint processes and go straight to formal enforcement in
order to maximize protection from retaliation. Such an incentive is terribly at odds

321. See, e.g., Townsend, 679 F.3d at 61 (Lohier, J., concurring) (noting that this same
subchapter “suggest[s] a role for non-governmental enforcement” and citing section
705(g)(1), which “authorizes the EEOC to cooperate with and . . . utilize regional, State,
local, and other agencies, both public and private, and individuals”).
322. See id. (acknowledging that Congress did not anticipate internal EEO policies
falling under the participation clause).
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with the Court’s pronouncements encouraging voluntary compliance and internal
employer processes for resolving complaints.323
In addition to treating internal complaints pursuant to employer discrimination
policies under the participation clause, a second doctrinal fix is for courts to take
into account how employer EEO policies shape employee perceptions about
discrimination and expressions of complaints in retaliation claims that are decided
under the opposition clause. When courts apply the reasonable belief doctrine and
the notice/specificity requirement under the opposition clause, they should
carefully consider how employer nondiscrimination policies influenced the
complainant’s understanding of discrimination and communications in opposition
to it.
While it is likely too late to convince the Court to abandon an objective
reasonableness requirement under the opposition clause in favor of a subjective
good-faith standard, there is no reason why reasonableness should be determined
independent of employer policies defining and prohibiting discrimination. Such
policies should be highly relevant to judicial determination of the reasonableness of
the employee’s belief that discrimination occurred, regardless of the narrower
scope of unlawful discrimination in the governing law. Neither the text of the
opposition clause nor the Supreme Court’s precedent forecloses such a result.
Although in Breeden itself the Court did not discuss how the employer’s sexual
harassment policy affected the plaintiff’s actions, it did not foreclose lower courts
from taking into account such considerations. Over a decade of experience with the
reasonable belief doctrine in the lower courts since Breeden demonstrates the need
for courts to take employer policies into account in determining the reasonableness
of employee understandings of discrimination.
Likewise, the way employees frame discrimination complaints may reflect the
terminology and direction of employer EEO policies. Rather than rigidly
demanding that employees use the terminology of discrimination and unlawful
employment practices in order to protect a complaint under the opposition clause,
courts should allow employees as much flexibility as employer policies do in
framing their complaints. If the employer understands the complaint to fall within
the contours of its policy covering discrimination, that should be enough to satisfy
the specificity requirement of the opposition clause.
Unless courts do a better job integrating retaliation law with employer’s internal
complaint processes, there will be a vast gulf between the on-paper protections of
retaliation law promised by the Supreme Court and the day-to-day risks employees
face in actually using these processes to address discrimination. The gaps in
retaliation law identified in this Article give cause for concern that employer
antidiscrimination policies and complaint processes are not fulfilling the role that
the law has set for them. Existing academic critiques of internal EEO governance
have not paid enough attention to the potential for such mechanisms to undermine
legal protections from retaliation for complaining about inequality in the

323. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 145 (2004) (noting Title VII’s statutory
purpose of promoting conciliation and voluntary compliance rather than litigation);
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (noting Title VII’s
purpose to promote self-regulation and self-examination of any discriminatory practices to
enable voluntary compliance).
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workplace. While the train toward internal EEO governance has long left the
station and is likely unstoppable, there should at least be recognition of how that
train is derailing the increasingly pro forma protections of retaliation law.
Focusing only on the pro-plaintiff cases in the Supreme Court docket leaves an
overly rosy view of retaliation law. Adjusting the lens to spotlight internal
complaints against the backdrop of employer EEO policies reveals a different
picture. Instead of a contrast with the Court’s pro-employer bent in employment
discrimination cases, there is a consistency in how retaliation law functions to
reinforce the Court’s worldview. The anti-retaliation story line from the Supreme
Court docket feeds into the Court’s skeptical approach to discrimination claims and
a belief that real discrimination—what the law recognizes as unlawful
discrimination—is rare and is adequately addressed when it does occur. The veneer
of robust protection from retaliation gives the impression of full and open access
for employee complaints about discrimination—which in turn supports judicial
skepticism about the prevalence of discrimination. Through this feedback loop,
retaliation law functions not to enhance law enforcement, but to legitimate the
narrow scope of discrimination law and to support a skeptical view of the
prevalence of discrimination in the modern EEO-saturated workplace.

